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Abstract 
A shift in occupational structure towards non-agricultural activities is widely viewed as a key 
component of European economic growth during the early modern ‘Little Divergence’. Yet 
little is known about this process in those parts of eastern-central Europe that experienced the 
early modern ‘second serfdom’, the massive increase in the institutional powers of landlords 
over the rural population. We analyze non-agricultural occupations under the second serfdom 
using data on 6,983 Bohemian villages in 1654. Bohemia resembled other eastern-central, 
nordic and southern European economies in having a lower percentage of non-agricultural 
activities than western Europe. But Bohemian serfs engaged in a wide array of industrial and 
commercial activities whose intensity varied significantly with village characteristics. Non-
agricultural activity showed a significant positive relationship with village size, pastoral 
agriculture, sub-peasant social strata, Jews, freemen, female household heads, and village 
mills, and a significant negative relationship with arable agriculture and urban 
agglomerations. Non-agricultural activity was also positively associated with landlord 
presence in the village, although the relationship turned negative at higher values and 
landlord presence reversed the positive effects of female headship and mills. Under the 
second serfdom, landlords encouraged serf activities from which they could extort rents, 
while stifling others which threatened their interests. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Change in occupational structure – particularly the shift away from agriculture 
towards industry and services – is increasingly viewed as a key indicator of economic 
growth. Debates about the early modern ‘Little Divergence’, during which the economies of 
the north Atlantic seaboard are thought to have decisively pulled ahead of the rest of Europe, 
centre partly on rival estimates of the size of the non-agricultural sector in different periods 
and places.2 Non-agricultural activity is viewed as indicating that agricultural productivity 
had risen enough to release labour and that specialization was increasing efficiency, 
generating gains from trade, widening consumer choice, and creating incentives to reallocate 
time to market work.3 Some scholars go so far as to ascribe a positive causal role specifically 
to the growth of rural non-agricultural activities. Theories of proto-industrialization, which 
focus exclusively on export-oriented rural manufactures, have been questioned.4 But studies 
of modern developing economies find that the rural nonfarm sector, producing mainly for 
local markets, can significantly benefit economic growth via production and consumption 
linkages.5 Occupational structure in general and rural non-agricultural intensification in 
particular are thus important economic indicators and potential engines of growth. 
Despite the theoretical importance ascribed to non-agricultural activity, we still lack 
evidence of its quantitative importance in different European economies during the ‘Little 
Divergence’, or the factors that favoured or hindered it. Economic historians are gradually 
compiling data for the advanced economies of northwest Europe, particularly England, but 
have hardly touched upon slower-growing parts of the continent. In particular, little is known 
of occupational structure in those many parts of central and eastern Europe which, between 
about 1500 and 1750, were subject to the second serfdom, the enormous growth in the 
institutional powers of the landlords over rural people’s economic options.  
This paper addresses that gap by investigating occupational structure in mid-
seventeenth-century Bohemia (the modern Czech Republic). From the sixteenth to the late 
eighteenth century, Bohemia was subject to the second serfdom. In the seventeenth century it 
also suffered economic and demographic devastation as a result of the Thirty Years War 
                                                        
2 See, most recently, Broadberry, Campbell and Van Leeuwen (2013); Clark (2013). 
3 See Crafts (1989); De Vries (2008); Allen (2009). 
4 See the discussion in Ogilvie and Cerman (1996). 
5 Haggblade, Hazell and Reardon (2007). 
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(1618-1648), followed by forced emigration of non-Catholics in the 1650s. During the two 
centuries before serf emancipation 1781, Bohemia had little claim to be an economically 
successful society. Its rural economy in particular suffered from lack of information, sparse 
transactions in many sectors, high risks, frightening insecurity, grinding poverty, and 
starvation for some of the poorest. Living standards, at least as far as these can be measured 
by life expectancies, were low by western European standards. After 1781, Bohemia 
developed into the economic powerhouse of the Habsburg lands, but in the seventeenth 
century it lay definitively on the low-performing side of the early modern ‘Little 
Divergence’.6   
We analyze occupational structure and its socioeconomic correlates in early modern 
Bohemia using an unusually detailed cross-sectional source, the Berní Rula, a national tax 
register commissioned in 1654. For two reasons, we focus on rural non-agricultural 
occupations. First, as discussed above, economists and historians hypothesize that rural 
nonfarm activity was not only a symptom but also a potential engine of economic growth. 
Second, the rural economy comprised most of the labour force and was much more 
thoroughly subjected to the second serfdom than urban centres, which enjoyed a number of 
institutional advantages favouring the practice of crafts, commerce, and other non-
agricultural occupations by their burghers. The 1654 tax register records information not only 
on occupation but also on a wide variety of other characteristics for thousands of Bohemian 
villages, enabling us both to derive a proxy measure for rural non-agricultural activity and to 
analyze what local characteristics were associated with variations in its intensity. This makes 
it possible to quantify rural occupational structure in an entire early modern European 
economy and to explore what factors favoured or hindered it. The findings shed light both on 
the shift away from agriculture during the early modern ‘Little Divergence’ and on the 
operation of the second serfdom. 
 
2. Berní Rula: Data Description 
 
In 1654, after the Thirty Years War, the Austrian Habsburg rulers of Bohemia 
commissioned a tax register called the Berní Rula. This register listed each landholding in the 
                                                        
6 Klíma (1955, 1957, 1959, 1974, 1979); Míka (1960); Petráň (1963, 1964); Maur (1964, 1965, 1976a, 1976b, 
1981, 1990); Janoušek (1967); Svodoba (1969); Myška (1979); Ogilvie (2001, 2005a, 2005b); Ogilvie and 
Edwards (2000); Klein (2013). 
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country, along with its holder, for the purpose of establishing tax liabilities and reorganizing 
the tax system. This paper analyzes rural occupational structure using data from the 1654 
Berní Rula for nearly 7,000 villages, covering approximately 70 per cent of the land area of 
seventeenth-century Bohemia.  
The Berní Rula was concerned to record all fiscally relevant information on each 
holding and everything attached to it, including the characteristics of the householder (if any) 
currently occupying it. A Bohemian ‘holding’ was typically either a peasant farm with more 
than enough arable land to feed an average family, a smallholding with some arable land but 
not enough for self-sufficiency, or a cottager holding with just a house and garden. The main 
reason the Berní Rula registrars focused on the holding rather than the holder was to control 
attempts at tax evasion whereby two or more holders would occupy a single holding for the 
duration of the enumeration process, temporarily vacating normally occupied and taxable 
holdings. A subsidiary reason the register focused on holdings was to collect information on 
the damage caused by the Thirty Years War and on the economic situation of newly settled 
holders who had been granted tax exemptions. For these reasons, the 1654 registrars 
meticulously recorded all holdings, including empty ones, regardless of whether they were 
suitable for occupation, and subsumed them in the final tax burden. 7 
The Berní Rula recorded five general types of information, covering the geographical 
and institutional characteristics of the settlement, the current state of the holding, the land 
attached to the holding, the livestock on the holding, and the characteristics of the holder.  
The settlement in which the holding was located was described in terms of both 
geographical location and institutional status. Geographical location was recorded via the 
specific name of the settlement, the feudal estate to which that settlement was subject, and the 
administrative region (Czech kraj, German Kreis) in which that estate was located. The 
institutional status of the settlement was recorded in multiple ways. There was a fundamental 
distinction between urban settlements, which enjoyed an array of legal and institutional 
privileges, and rural settlements, which lacked those entitlements. Urban settlements were 
further categorized into subject towns (those feudally subject to a noble landlord), royal 
towns (feudally subject to the crown), and free towns (not tied in feudal subjection). Rural 
                                                        
7 The institutional and political aspects of the organization of the Berní Rula are discussed in Pekař (1932); 
Berní Rula 1 (1950); Ogilvie and Cerman (1995); Cerman and Zeitlhofer (2002); and Matušíková and Ogilvie 
(2006). 
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settlements – the ones analyzed in this paper – were categorized as being feudally subject to a 
great noble lord, a minor knight, the crown, a religious institution, or a town. 
The current state of the holding was registered primarily in terms of whether it was 
currently occupied or lying empty at the time of registration in 1654. In the case of an empty 
holding, the register recorded whether it was currently being used by a non-resident 
individual or family, by the village community, by the feudal landlord, or by no user at all. 
The register also commented fairly systematically on whether a holding was in good 
condition, in poor condition, burnt down, partly collapsed, or completely collapsed; whether 
it had been newly settled between 1651 and 1654 and in which year; and whether the 
construction of new buildings was in progress. 
The land appertaining to each holding was precisely quantified. A first measure was 
the total area of arable land on the holding, measured in strych (approximately 0.29 hectares). 
A second was the area of arable devoted to winter crops: these were the cereals sown in the 
autumn which germinated before winter arrived, and either persevered or grew under snow 
cover before continuing their life cycle in springtime, maturing in late spring or early 
summer; they generally had a much higher yield than spring cereals because they could use 
snow as moisture for growth. A third measure was the area of arable on the holding devoted 
to spring crops: these were the cereals planted in early springtime which matured later in the 
summer; they generally required more irrigation and had a lower yield than winter cereals. 
The register also frequently recorded the presence of a mill, brewery, inn, sawmill, or smithy 
on the holding. For some parts of Bohemia, but unfortunately not all, the registers recorded 
forest, gardens, vineyards, hop-fields, and unused land (fallow or waste) attached to each 
holding, and some even recorded the quality of the soil. 
The livestock attached to the holding were carefully recorded, partly because enserfed 
peasants were obliged to deliver to their landlords forced labour services with draft animals. 
For each holding, the register listed the number of working animals (sometimes broken down 
into oxen and horses), the number of cattle (sometimes divided into mature and immature 
animals), and the number of pigs. Some regions also recorded the number of sheep and goats.  
The current human occupant of the holding, if any, was described in some detail. The 
register recorded the name of the holder, from which his or her gender can be derived. The 
register also recorded the holder’s social stratum which, as discussed in Section 7 below, was 
legally defined and had far-reaching implications for the person’s entitlements to engage in 
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particular economic activities and his or her obligations to render particular services and 
payments, both to the overlord and to the crown. Finally, the 1654 register recorded what 
occupation, apart from farming that holding, was pursued by the holding’s occupant – the 
focus of the present paper.  
 
3. Characteristics of Early Modern Bohemian Occupational Structure 
 
But is there any point in analyzing non-agricultural activity in a serf economy? Under 
the second serfdom, which gathered force in Bohemia from the second half of the sixteenth 
century onwards, the economic options of serfs were subjected to increasingly severe 
constraints by the institutional powers of their landlords. Were serfs able to move into non-
agricultural activities or, indeed, to choose their occupations at all? Much historiography 
portrays eastern European serfs as having been actuated by Chayanovian peasant mentalities 
that caused them to prefer subsistence farming and avoid markets and money, precluding a 
shift towards rural industry or commerce.8 Other strands of the historiography argue that even 
if serfs had wished to shift out of agriculture to specialize in industrial or commercial 
activities, landlords prevented them because it diverted serfs’ efforts from the agricultural 
production from which lords could extort rents and labour dues; if serfs participated in non-
agricultural activity at all, it was merely when they had to render forced labour services in 
centralized manorial manufactories.9 If such assumptions were true, the rural economy under 
the second serfdom should have been exclusively agricultural. Do quantitative data for 
seventeenth-century Bohemia bear out these assumptions? 
We have compiled a data set from the 1654 Berní Rula which encompasses more than 
70 per cent of the total land area of Bohemia in 1654, and covers 7,257 villages on 893 feudal 
estates.10 Of these villages, 274 were completely empty in 1654, yielding a data set of 6,983 
occupied villages whose structure we analyze. For each village, we calculated the percentage 
of holders recorded as practising an occupation outside agriculture. These occupations did not 
include labour by serfs in centralized manorial factories, to the extent that it was taking place. 
Rather, the occupations recorded in the Berní Rula were ones undertaken by individual serf 
                                                        
8 For a critical survey of this literature, see Ogilvie (2001), 430-5; Ogilvie (2013). 
9 For a detailed exposition of this view in the context of proto-industrialization in Europe between c. 1500 and c. 
1850, see Kriedte, Medick and Schlumbohm (German orig. 1977, English transl. 1981). 
10 Červený et al. (2003), xxii. 
 
 
6
households on their own initiative, ranging from primary non-agricultural occupations such 
as miner and charcoal burner, through craft occupations such as smith, tinker, tanner, miller, 
tailor, weaver, and cooper, to commercial and administrative occupations such as merchant, 
petty trader, tavern-keeper, parish clerk, and schoolmaster.  
The occupations recorded in the Berní Rula should probably be regarded as a 
minimum measure of non-agricultural activity since, like most pre-modern registers, this one 
was drawn up with a primary focus on real estate. However, the Berní Rula had no reason to 
under-record non-agricultural activity to a greater extent than other pre-modern documentary 
sources. On the contrary, several characteristics of the Berní Rula justify regarding the 
information it contains on rural nonfarm activity as a reliable proxy measure of underlying 
occupational structure.  
First, the Berní Rula neither rewarded nor penalized the state tax commissioners, the 
manorial authorities, or the serfs themselves for reporting non-agricultural activity. Tax 
liability was determined via a standardized tax unit (the osedly) calculated on the basis of the 
number of serfs of each legal stratum, with one osedly defined as equal to one ‘peasant’, four 
‘smallholders’, or eight ‘cottagers’. The earning capacities of the taxpayer, whether from 
agriculture or other activities, did not influence the data collected; insofar as the tax burden 
was subsequently adjusted (e.g. to take account of variations in soil quality or farm size) this 
was a response appeals by landlords which were not foreseen at the time the data were 
collected.11 Since the rules concerning how tax information would be collected and how the 
tax burden would be calculated were announced before the Berní Rula commissioners 
collected their information, and did not refer to agricultural occupations, there were no 
incentives for misreporting the latter.  
Second, although the Berní Rula commissioners were not instructed to do so, they did 
record non-agricultural occupations copiously for inhabitants of towns.12 This demonstrates 
the detail with which, when they visited a settlement, the commissioners inquired into the 
economic circumstances of each taxpayer, and provides reassurance on the question of under-
reporting. 
                                                        
11 Pekař (1932), 4-5, 9; Berní Rula I (1950), 38-40. 
12 Pekař (1932), 9. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Villages in Bohemia, Berní Rula 1654  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
percentage of non-agricultural occupations 6983 0.06 0.15 0.00 1.00 
number of holdings 6983 11.44 10.79 1 133 
percentage of empty holdings 6983 0.14 0.20 0.00 0.99 
total arable land of occupied holdings per holder 6983 26.31 23.32 0.00 390 
number of working animals per holder 6983 1.80 1.16 0.00 11 
number of cattle per holder 6983 2.47 1.35 0.00 34 
percentage of 'cottagers' 6983 0.24 0.29 0.00 1.00 
percentage of smallholders’ 6983 0.13 0.22 0.00 1.00 
percentage of 'freemen' 6983 0.02 0.13 0.00 1.00 
percentage of Jews 6983 0.001 0.03 0.00 1.00 
percentage of female household heads 6983 0.032 0.10 0.00 1.00 
presence of a town on an estate 6983 0.55 0.50 0 1 
presence of a mill 6983 0.06 0.23 0 1 
percentage of holders with less than 15 strych 6983 0.36 0.34 0.00 1.00 
presence of landlord in at least 1 holding 6983 0.07 0.25 0 1 
number of holdings held/used by landlord 6983 0.15 0.80 0.00 19 
percentage of arable land held/used by landlord 6910 0.02 0.09 0.00 1.00 
Sources: see text      
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Third, different state commissions do not appear to have adopted different practices 
relating to the recording of non-agricultural occupations. We carried out statistical tests 
which established that the percentage of non-agricultural occupations recorded was not 
significantly related to any measurable characteristic of recording conventions, including the 
identity or composition of the state commission assigned to draw up the Berní Rula in 
particular regions and estates.  
Fourth, as we shall see, the rural non-agricultural occupations recorded in the Berní 
Rula yield estimates of the overall size of the non-agricultural sector in mid-seventeenth-
century Bohemia which are consistent with the few available data for comparable early 
modern economies in eastern-central, nordic and southern Europe.  
Finally, as the econometric analyses in later sections show, the percentage of rural 
non-agricultural occupations recorded in the Berní Rula varied substantially across Bohemian 
localities, in ways that were significantly related to other socioeconomic characteristics of 
rural settlements.  
What emerges, then, when we investigate rural occupational structure in mid-
seventeenth-century Bohemia? Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the 6,983 villages in 
our data set. The proportion of householders in Bohemian villages engaging in non-
agricultural activities in 1654 varied between zero and 100 per cent of all household heads in 
a village, with an average of 6.7 per cent. These findings decisively refute the traditional 
assumptions discussed above, according to which serfdom precluded rural non-agricultural 
activity except in the framework of serf labour in centralized demesne manufactories. Rather, 
1 in 15 Bohemian serf households was engaged in a non-agricultural activity sufficiently 
prominent to be recorded in a tax register primarily focussed on landholding and agriculture.  
Table 2 places these findings in the context of other parts of early modern Europe, 
while recognizing that compiling occupational data for the period before 1800 is still a work 
in progress.13 The first step was to use the findings on rural occupational structure in our 
sample to calculate estimates of overall occupational structure in the Bohemian economy as a 
whole. Our data set of 6,983 occupied villages and 274 unoccupied ones covers c. 70 per cent 
of the area of Bohemia but excludes the capital city Prague and a number of other urban 
centres. Combining our findings on rural occupational structure with plausible assumptions
                                                        
13 On the paucity of data on European occupational structure before the nineteenth century, see De Vries and 
Van der Woude (1997), 527. 
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Table 2: Percentage of Non-Agricultural Activity in Rural Areas and Whole Economy, Various European Societies, 1381-1800 
Society Date 
Rural non-
agricultural 
(%) 
Total non-
agricultural 
(%) 
Source 
England: 892 settlements 1381  33.0 Broadberry, Campbell & Van Leeuwen (2013), 17 (Table 1). 
England: Rutland (Cornwall) 1522 22.8  Broadberry, Campbell & Van Leeuwen (2013), 18 (Table 2). 
England: Coventry + Babergh + Rutland 1522  31.8 Broadberry, Campbell & Van Leeuwen (2013), 18 (Table 2). 
Poland: Greater Poland 1580 10.4  Gieysztor (1997), 567 (Table 96). 
Poland: Lesser Poland 1580 12.3  Gieysztor (1997), 567 (Table 96). 
Poland: Mazowsze 1580 6.9  Gieysztor (1997), 567 (Table 96). 
Poland: total 1580 10.2  Gieysztor (1997), 567 (Table 96). 
Bohemia: 6,983 villages 1654 6.7 18.2-31.3 Berní Rula data set. 
Netherlands: total 1675  60.0 De Vries & Van der Woude (1997), 527. 
England: total 1700  54.0 Broadberry, Campbell & Van Leeuwen (2013), 19 (Table 3). 
Netherlands: Friesland 1749 38.0 56.0 De Vries & Van der Woude (1997), 525 (Table 11.3). 
Netherlands: Veluwe 1749 34.0 53.0 De Vries & Van der Woude (1997), 525 (Table 11.3). 
Netherlands: Overijssel 1795 40.0 54.0 De Vries & Van der Woude (1997), 525 (Table 11.3). 
Italy: Santo Marco dei Cavoti c. 1750 < 10.0 10.0 Curtis (2013), 26 with n. 150 
Italy:Locorotondo c. 1750 < 14.0 14.0 Curtis (2013), 26 with n. 150 
Netherlands: total c. 1750  59.0 De Vries & Van der Woude (1997), 528 (Table 11.5). 
Finland: total 1754  21.3 Mitchell (1981), 163. 
England: total 1755  56.0 Shaw-Taylor (2009); Shaw-Taylor et al. (2010). 
Finland: total 1769  19.8 Mitchell (1981), 163. 
Netherlands: total c. 1800  59.0 De Vries & Van der Woude (1997), 528 (Table 11.5). 
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 about the size and occupational structure of the missing regions and urban centres yields an 
estimated overall percentage of non-agricultural occupations which lies in the range between 
18.2 per cent (excluding Prague and assuming towns were 55 per cent non-agricultural) and 
31.3 per cent (including Prague and assuming towns were 100 per cent non-agricultural). 
Table 2 shows that the percentage of non-agricultural activity in Bohemia in 1654 was very 
similar to that for Poland in 1580, southern Italy around 1750, and Finland in the 1750s and 
1760s. These eastern-central, southern, and nordic European regions were, as late as the 
eighteenth century, characterized by a percentage of non-agricultural activity of 6-14 per cent 
in rural areas and 10-30 per cent overall. This contrasts starkly with England and the 
Netherlands, which from a very early date were characterized by a percentage of non-
agricultural activity of 20-40 per cent in rural areas and 30-60 per cent overall. The non-
agricultural sector in seventeenth-century Bohemia was thus noticeably smaller than in the 
precociously advanced north Atlantic economies, but comparable in size to what is known of 
other economies in eastern-central, southern, and nordic Europe.  
As Table 1 reveals, moreover, there was very substantial variation across Bohemian 
rural settlements, with some villages in which all householders undertook non-agricultural 
activities and others in which no-one did so. This raises the puzzle of what gave rise to such 
wide variation in the same rural economy at the same period. Exploring this question may 
help shed light on the wider issue of why occupational structure varied so greatly across 
different parts of Europe in the era of the ‘Little Divergence’.  
A first step is to delve more deeply into the differences between the Bohemian 
villages with and without non-agricultural activities. As Table 3 illustrates, the Bohemian 
villages in which at least some householders engaged in non-agricultural activities had more 
households on average than purely agricultural villages, and contained more ‘sub-peasants’ 
(smallholders and cottagers), freemen, Jews, female household heads, and mills. They also 
had fewer empty holdings, a smaller average holding size, and fewer working animals and 
cattle per holding.  
Interestingly, the number of holdings held or used by the landlord was higher in those 
villages, though the percentage of village land held or used by the landlord was lower. The 
precise implications for serfs of having some holdings in the village currently used by the 
landlord are complex, as we shall see during the econometric analysis. It is possible that the 
presence of the landlord or his agent on a holding in the village might have offered greater
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Table 3: Summary Statistics of Villages in Bohemia by Percentage of Non-Agricultural Occupations, Berní Rula 1654       
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 Percentage non-agricultural occupations > 0   Percentage non-agricultural occupations = 0 
percentage of non-agricultural occupations 1822 0.22 0.22 0.01 1.00  5161 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
number of holdings 1822 17.57 14.81 1 133  5161 9.28 7.90 1 99 
percentage of empty holdings 1822 0.12 0.17 0.00 0.88  5161 0.14 0.21 0.00 0.99 
total arable land of occupied holdings per 
holder 
1822 21.91 18.41 0 240 
 
5161 27.86 24.64 0 390 
number of working animals per holder 1822 1.48 1.00 0 8  5161 1.92 1.19 0 11 
number of cattle per holder 1822 2.38 1.12 0 14  5161 2.51 1.43 0 34 
percentage of 'cottagers' 1822 0.29 0.28 0.00 1.00  5161 0.22 0.29 0.00 1.00 
percentage of smallholders’ 1822 0.17 0.23 0.00 1.00  5161 0.11 0.22 0.00 1.00 
percentage of 'freemen' 1822 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00  5161 0.01 0.12 0.00 1.00 
percentage of Jews 1822 0.004 0.05 0.00 1.00  5161 0.0002 0.01 0.00 1.00 
percentage of female household heads 1822 0.034 0.06 0.00 0.50  5161 0.032 0.11 0.00 1.00 
presence of a town on an estate 1822 0.57 0.49 0 1  5161 0.54 0.50 0 1 
presence of a mill 1822 0.02 0.40 0 1  5161 0.01 0.08 0 1 
percentage of holders with less than 15 strych 1822 0.48 0.32 0.00 1.00  5161 0.32 0.34 0.00 1.00 
presence of landlord in at least 1 holding 1822 0.08 0.27 0 1  5161 0.06 0.25 0 1 
number of holdings held/used by landlord 1822 0.165 0.82 0 16  5161 0.146 0.79 0 19 
percentage of arable land held/used by landlord 1804 0.016 0.08 0.00 1.00   5106 0.018 0.09 0.00 1.00 
Sources: see text            
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 possibilities of manorial information, monitoring and control over villagers’ activities. In that 
case, this variable might be interpreted as a proxy measure of the local strength of the second 
serfdom, although only at its ‘intensive margin’ (stronger versus weaker enforcement of an 
existing institutional system), not at the ‘extensive margin’ (presence or absence of the 
institutional system altogether). These interpretive issues are explored in greater depth in 
Section 10 below.  
Table 4 shows that the 6.8 per cent of villages with at least one holding currently 
being used by the landlord differed from those without in many ways. They had more 
households, a higher percentage of empty holdings, smaller plots of arable land, slightly 
fewer working animals, many fewer cattle, and a lower percentage of cottagers, freemen, and 
female household heads. Slightly higher non-agricultural activity was thus only one of many 
distinctive characteristics of villages in which at least one holding was being used by the 
landlord.  
The figures on early modern Bohemian rural occupational structure and its 
socioeconomic correlates presented in Tables 1-4 are unconditional averages, of course, and 
we must be careful in interpreting such simple correlations. For one thing, they do not control 
for other village characteristics; for another, they do not say anything about causality. It could 
be that the characteristics we observe in the villages with non-agricultural occupations in fact 
encouraged those activities, but it also could be that non-agricultural activity in a village 
caused the village to develop specific characteristics. Moreover, villages with certain 
underlying characteristics might attract both non-agricultural activities and other phenomena 
such as female headship, cattle-raising, or the desire of the landlord to occupy holdings there.  
The findings from Tables 1-4 thus call for a multivariate analysis of the relationship 
between rural non-agricultural activities and village characteristics under the second serfdom, 
to which we now turn. 
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Table 4: Summary Statistics of Villages in Bohemia by Presence of Landlord, Berní Rula 1654.             
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 Landlord Present in Village   Landlord Not Present in Village 
percentage of non-agricultural occupations 472 0.063 0.14 0.00 1.00  6511 0.057 0.15 0.00 1.00 
number of holdings 472 13.62 10.47 1 118  6511 11.28 10.80 1 133 
percentage of empty holdings 472 0.29 0.20 0.00 0.86  6511 0.13 0.19 0.00 0.99 
total arable land of occupied holdings per holder 472 25.05 16.39 0 121  6511 26.40 23.75 0 390 
number of working animals per holder 472 1.78 1.05 0 6.5  6511 1.81 1.17 0 11 
number of cattle per holder 472 2.20 1.14 0 11.5  6511 2.49 1.37 0 34 
percentage of 'cottagers' 472 0.21 0.26 0.00 1.00  6511 0.24 0.29 0.00 1.00 
percentage of ‘smallholders’ 472 0.13 0.23 0.00 1.00  6511 0.13 0.22 0.00 1.00 
percentage of 'freemen' 472 0.002 0.02 0.00 0.50  6511 0.02 0.13 0.00 1.00 
percentage of Jews 472 0.003 0.05 0.00 1.00  6511 0.001 0.03 0.00 1.00 
percentage of female household heads 472 0.029 0.08 0 1  6511 0.033 0.10 0 1 
presence of a town on an estate 472 0.38 0.49 0 1  6511 0.56 0.50 0 1 
presence of a mill 472 0.06 0.24 0 1  6511 0.06 0.23 0 1 
percentage of holders with less than 15 strych 472 0.34 0.31 0.00 1.00  6511 0.36 0.35 0.00 1.00 
presence of landlord in at least 1 holding 472 1 0 1 1  6511 0 0 0 0 
number of holdings held/used by landlord 472 2.23 2.21 1 19  6511 0 0 0 0 
percentage of arable land held/used by landlord 470 0.26 0.22 0.00 1.00   6440 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sources: see text            
 
 
14
4. The Multivariate Analysis of Early Modern Bohemian Occupational Structure 
 
We undertook a multivariate regression analysis to investigate the relationship 
between the percentage of holders employed in non-agricultural occupations in a Bohemian 
village in 1654 and the characteristics of that village. The explanatory variables included 
measures of the village’s size, its arable sector, its pastoral sector, its social composition, its 
female headship, the presence of mills, the proximity of towns, and landlord presence in the 
village. The general regression equation we estimated can be written as follows: 
NonagricEmplij= α + β1(Village Size)ij+ β2(Arable Sector)ij+ β3(Pastoral Sector)ij+ β4(Social 
Composition)ij+ β5(Other Characteristics)ij+ β6(Landlord Presence)ij+ δj +εij  (1) 
NonagricEmplij is the percentage of non-agricultural activity in village i located on an 
estate j, α is a constant term, δj is an estate j fixed effect, and εij is an error term. The β- 
coefficients represent the vectors of estimated coefficients, since each set of explanatory 
variables contains several regressors.  
Village Size is captured by two variables: the number of occupied holdings in the 
village (largely exogenous); and the percentage of empty holdings in the village (to control 
for the effects of the Thirty Years War and post-war emigration). For all practical purposes, 
the number of holdings in a Bohemian village in 1654 can be regarded as exogenous to the 
current occupational structure of that village. It was not possible to migrate freely into a 
Bohemian village and set up a new household there: an in-migrant had to take on an existing 
holding or live as a lodger with an existing householder. The number of holdings in a village, 
therefore, was the outcome not of short-term, individual choices, but rather of a long-term 
process of development. Initially, it was determined by the original village settlement charter, 
typically dating from the medieval period, which legally fixed the number, size, and legal 
stratum of all holdings in the village. This number could be modified gradually over ensuing 
centuries via manorial and communal pressure and negotiation: typically, the number of 
holdings of the ‘peasant’ stratum remained almost static, while the number of ‘sub-peasant’ 
(smallholder and cottager) holdings gradually increased.14 In principle, therefore, the number 
of holdings in a village could  be influenced over very long periods by economic 
opportunities (including non-agricultural ones) which exerted pressure on the manorial and 
                                                        
14 For a discussion of this process, see Cerman (1995); Ogilvie and Cerman (1995). 
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communal institutions that decided on whether new holdings could be established. In the 
short to medium term, however, it could not be changed. For all practical purposes, the 
number of holdings in a Bohemian village at any given date during the second serfdom was 
determined institutionally and historically, and was thus exogenous to the current 
occupational structure of that village. 
Arable Sector is captured in our regressions by the number of strych of arable land per 
holder in the village.15 The size of arable land attached to each holding resembles the number 
of holdings in the village in being fixed legally and institutionally via the original village 
charter. In Bohemia until 1869, each landholding was legally impartible: its owner was not 
allowed to sell or bequeath any land separately from the rest of the farm.16 The average 
amount of arable land per village holding could change through the formation of new ‘sub-
peasant’ holdings with smaller amounts of arable land but, as discussed above, this was a 
gradual process which took place over a period of generations or centuries, via institutional 
and social negotiation. For all practical purposes, the average area of arable land per holding 
in a village at any given date during the second serfdom was exogenous to the current 
occupational structure of that village.  
Pastoral Sector is measured by two variables: the number of working animals per 
holder and the number of cattle per holder. In actuality, there is a case for regarding working 
animals as part of the arable sector, since they were mainly used to draw ploughs and other 
equipment used in arable cultivation. The number of working animals was to some extent 
institutionally fixed via the manorial rental charter (Urbar) which legally obliged each holder 
of a particular status of holding to keep a enough draft animals to supply a specified quantity 
of draft services to the landlord’s demesne, although they were also used in serfs’ own arable 
cultivation. The number of cattle (non-working animals) was also to some extent 
institutionally determined, since it reflected the holder’s ownership of private pasture or 
access to communal grazing. But the number of cattle on a holding was also partly a choice 
variable, reflecting the availability of household labour and the opportunity costs of 
allocating it to tend animals. To some extent, thefore, a household was likely to have chosen 
the number of cattle it owned simultaneously with its decision about engaging in non-
agricultural activity, as we discuss below in Section 6.  
                                                        
15 As mentioned above, 1 strych = c. 0.29 hectares. 
16 Zeitlhofer (2011), 133; Velková (2012), 510. 
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Social Composition is captured in our regression model by the percentage of holders 
in the village identified as belonging to each legally defined social stratum. The Berní Rula 
identified each taxpayer according to his or her institutionally defined social category: town 
burgher (měšťan, Bürger); peasant (sedlák, rolník, Bauer); smallholder (zahradník, Gärtner), 
cottager (chalupník, Häusler), inmate-lodger (podruh, Hausgenosse), freeman (svobodník, 
Freibauer), and Jew (žid, Jude). As mentioned above, it was not possible for a new holder to 
migrate freely into any Bohemian village and settle there: he or she had to live on an existing 
holding of defined social stratum. The relative size of each stratum in the village was laid 
down in the original village settlement charter and modified, if at all, very gradually by 
pressure on manorial and communal institrutions over a period of centuries. For all practical 
purposes, the size of the various legal strata in a Bohemian village at any given point during 
the second serfdom was exogenous to the current occupational structure of the village. 
The Other Characteristics in our regression model include four further variables with 
the potential to affect occupational structure. The first is the percentage of holders in the 
village with less than 15 strych (c. 4.3 hectares) of arable land, since this was the amount 
required for an average early modern central European family to live completely from 
farming.17 The legal impartibility of Bohemian holdings, together with the slow historical 
process by which new and smaller holdings were permitted to form in Bohemian villages, 
meant that this variable was exogenous to the current occupational structure of the village.  
A second ‘other’ characteristic was the presence of a mill in the village. The location 
of mills in pre-modern economies depended primarily upon natural endowments, specifically 
the existence and hydrological characteristics (water volume, depth, flow gradient) of the 
watercourse providing the energy to drive the mill. Building a mill was a non-trivial 
undertaking, moreover, which was unlikely to be initiated in response to short-term 
fluctuations in local demand for milling power. The presence of a village mill was therefore 
exogenous to the current occupational structure of the village. 
A third ‘other’ characteristic was the presence of a town on the estate in which the 
village was located. In early modern Bohemia, a town was not simply a settlement that was 
larger in size than a village; rather, it was an institutional entity with a distinctive legal status. 
A Bohemian town was a settlement that had been granted privileges by the landlord, the 
crown, or another authority which endowed its inhabitants with specific social and economic 
                                                        
17 Mattmüller (1983), 42; Cerman (1996), 190. 
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entitlements. Town presence was thus exogenous to the current occupational structure of any 
village on the estate.  
A final ‘other’ characteristic was the percentage of female household heads in the 
village. This was a choice variable with potential two-way causal links with occupational 
structure, raising issues of endogeneity which are discussed below in Section 9. 
A final set of variables in our regression model consists of three alternative measures 
of Landlord Presence. First, we use a dummy variable indicating the presence in that village 
of a holding described as being held or used by the landlord. Second, we use the number of 
holdings in the village which are described as being held or used by the landlord. Finally, we 
use the percentage of arable land in the village which is described as being held or used by 
the landlord. The presence of the landlord on village holdings was not a permanent 
characteristic of the village in question, but rather a relatively short-term phenomenon. 
Manorial court records in mid-seventeenth-century Bohemia show clearly that landlords 
regarded empty holdings as an undesirable and, they hoped, temporary result of mortality or 
emigration, which should either be filled as soon as possible with new serfs or be dissolved 
and engrossed into the manorial demesne.18 As discussed below, because the presence of the 
landlord occupying or using a temporarily empty serf holding was a choice variable on the 
part of the landlord, it had potential two-way causal links to the current occupational structure 
of the village. The presence of the landlord on village holdings could affect local 
occupational choices; but local occupational structure could also attract the landlord to move 
into village holdings. The resulting endogeneity of landlord presence and occupational 
structure are discussed in detail in Section 10.  
Four major econometric issues arose in our analysis. The first was potential 
multicollinearity among the explanatory variables. One notable advantage of our data set is 
the availability of information on an unusually large number of village characteristics. But 
this raised the problem that some of these characteristics may be highly correlated with one 
another. To establish the extent of the problem, we calculated correlations among the 
explanatory variables and variation inflation factors for each of the explanatory variables. 
                                                        
18 Cerman (1996); Ogilvie (2001); Cerman and Zeitlhofer (2002). 
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The correlations were small and the variation inflation factors less than 2, indicating that 
multicollinearity was not an issue.19 
Second, our dependent variable is censored at zero, so we use a Tobit estimator. The 
Tobit estimator, however, makes a parametric assumption about the distribution of the error 
term εij. To check the sensitivity of our results to that assumption, we used estimators which 
relax the assumption: ordinary least squares (OLS) and the pseudo-Poisson maximum 
likelihood estimator (PPML). OLS is a widely used estimator which belongs to a class of 
semiparametric estimators relaxing parametric assumptions concerning the error term.20 Even 
though the OLS estimator does not deal with the problem of censoring, we used it as an initial 
robustness check. The PPML estimator also relaxes parametric assumptions concerning the 
error term and provides consistent estimates, even if the error term is misspecified. 21 Recent 
research also shows that the PPML estimator is robust to the presence of a very large 
percentage of zero values in a data set. We took advantage of that feature, and re-estimated 
regression equation (1) using this estimator.22   
Third, the literature on Bohemia, as well as on many other early modern European 
economies under serfdom, emphasizes that landlords differed greatly in how they 
administered their estates and hence in the economic constraints they imposed on the rural 
population.23 As a consequence, each village might be influenced by an unobserved effect of 
the particular estate to which it was subject.24 We controlled for such unobservable estate-
effects using estate-specific dummies δj. In addition, however, we regarded it as prudent to 
allow for arbitrary correlation and heteroskedasticity of errors within estates.25 This is 
because in the case of correlation or heteroskedasticity within clusters – in our case among 
the villages subject to a particular estate – the usual standard errors will be biased 
downwards, prompting us to identify estimated coefficients as statistically significant even 
                                                        
19 The only exception is the ‘percentage of peasants’ which is correlated with the ‘percentage of cottagers’ and 
the ‘percentage of smallholders’ respectively. This is not surprising, given that these were the three largest rural 
social strata. We discuss this issue in later sections of the paper.  
20 E.g. Ichimura (1993). 
21 Gouriéroux et al. (1984a, 1984b). 
22 Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), (2011). One of the properties of PPML is that the dependent variable does 
not have to be an integer: see Gouriéroux et al (1984a, 1984b) and Cameron and Trivedi (1998). We therefore 
estimated PPML with the dependent variable being the number of non-agricultural occupations in a village as 
well as their percentage. The estimation used a Stata user-written command ppml. 
23 Ogilvie and Edwards (2000); Dennison and Ogilvie (2007); Dennison (2011); Ogilvie (2013). 
24 Concrete evidence of this phenomenon on two Bohemian estates is discussed in Ogilvie and Edwards (2000). 
25 Wooldridge (2010), 867. 
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though they might not actually be so. To remedy this, we used cluster-robust standard errors 
at the estate level. 
A final econometric issue was the presence of outliers. Our data set contained 
observations with extreme values for four variables: village size, female headship, farm size, 
and animal numbers. First, there were 490 villages with fewer than 2 occupied holdings and 5 
villages with over 100. By the standards of Bohemia in 1654, where the mean village had 11 
occupied holdings, these villages were outliers. Second, the dataset contained 147 villages 
with over 30 per cent female household heads, which was nearly ten times the mean female 
headship rate for Bohemian villages in the early modern period.26 Third, the data set 
contained 100 villages with over 100 strych arable land per holding, which was nearly four 
times the average for Bohemia in 1654. Finally, there were 55 villages with more than 5 
working animals per holding, which was extremely high given that the mean was less than 2 
animals per holding. Because these observations fell so far outside the norm for early modern 
Bohemia, it is possible that they reflect inaccuracies in the data sources or peculiar local 
circumstances.27 This possibility is a matter of particular concern given that the Tobit 
estimator is highly sensitive to extreme values of variables.  
We therefore estimated our models both with and without the observations affected by 
these extreme values. Although the models were not affected by the inclusion or exclusion of 
observations with extreme village size, farm size, or animal numbers, they were strongly 
affected by the 147 observations with extremely high percentages (over 30 per cent) of 
female household heads. These villages were outliers in two respects, since they were also 
extremely small: 77 per cent of them had only 1, 2 or 3 occupied holdings, a fact that 
contributed to generating extreme values of female headship for purely arithmetical reasons.28 
Since these 147 villages had 10 times the average female headship rate, predominantly 
consisted of settlements with 3 holders or fewer, and accounted for only 2.1 per cent of all 
                                                        
26 On  female headship in Bohemia in 1654, see Table 1 below; on female headship in Bohemia at various dates 
between 1591 and 1722, see Ogilvie and Edwards (2000), esp. 969 (Table 1). 
27 An example of unusual local circumstances is a situation in which a village had an extremely small number of 
occupied holdings; such a village was not only an outlier in itself, but its very small number of holdings would 
in turn tend, for purely arithmetical reasons, to generate extreme values of variables (such as female headship) 
calculated as a percentage of occupied holdings or those (such as mean size of arable or mean number of 
working animals) calculated as an average across occupied holdings. 
28 The unusually small size of the 147 villages with over 30% female headship can be seen from the following 
frequency distribution: 22% had only 1 occupied holding, 42% had 1-2 holdings, 77% had 1-3 holdings, 93% 
had 1-6 holdings, and 98% had 1-10 holdings (and were thus below the mean village size in 1654). For 
comparison, of the 6,386 villages with 30% or lower female headship, 9% had only 1 occupied holding, 16% 
had 1-2 holdings, 23% had 1-3 holdings, 44% had 1-6 holdings, and 67% had 1-10 holdings. 
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observations, we regarded the models estimated excluding these extreme observations as 
more reliable. The models reported in Tables 5-7 are therefore those estimated excluding 
these outlier values for female headship. A more radical treatment of the outlier issue, which 
additionally excludes observations with fewer than 2 or more than 100 holders, with more 
than 100 strych average holding size, and with more than 5 working animals per holding, is 
reported in Appendix B. 
The regression result for the basic specification is presented in Table 5, column 1. 
Holding constant all variables included in the regression, the percentage of non-agricultural 
activity is positively related to the size of the village, the percentage of smallholders and 
cottagers, the presence of a mill, female household headship, the number of (non-working) 
cattle per holder, and the presence of holdings used by the landlord. It is negatively related to 
the area of arable land per holder, the number of working animals per holder, and the 
presence of a town on the estate.  
Before discussing the economic implications of these findings, we must take account 
of the fact that parts of Bohemia had been a battleground at one or more points during the 
Thirty Years War. As mentioned earlier, the Berní Rula carefully recorded the presence of 
empty and ruined holdings, and this enables us to calculate a measure of war destruction: the 
percentage of empty holdings in a village. Controlling for empty holdings is important not 
only because it holds constant the effects of the Thirty Years War, but also because it 
accounts for a potential bias in our landlord presence variable, since the use of an empty 
holding by a landlord might also be picking up the effect of the war. The specification in 
Table 5 column 2 takes these factors into account, and finds that the percentage of empty 
holdings is negatively associated with the percentage of non-agricultural activity in a village. 
Its presence in the equation does not change the statistical significance of the original 
variables, but it does non-trivially increase the magnitude of the coefficient on the variable 
measuring landlord presence. This indicates that our suspicions were right: the landlord 
presence variable was indeed picking up the negative effect of empty holdings on non-
agricultural activity, which must therefore be controlled for.29
                                                        
29 We see that the estimated coefficients of the variables in the category ‘other village characteristics’ also 
changed their magnitudes, which indicates that they were also picking up the effect of empty holdings in the 
village, further corroborating the importance of controlling for it.  
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Table 5: Regression Analysis of the Determinants of Non-Agricultural Activity in Rural Bohemia in 1654 (Tobit Model)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Size of Village        
number of holdings 0.0051*** 0.0053*** 0.0052*** 0.00532*** 0.00528*** 0.00528*** 0.0054*** 
 [0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00002] 
percentage of empty holdings  -0.179*** -0.185*** -0.179*** -0.1791*** -0.172*** -0.159*** 
  [0.0019] [0.002] [0.0019] [0.0018] [0.0021] [0.00183] 
Arable Sector        
total arable land on occupied holdings per holder -0.0013*** -0.0012*** -0.0011*** -0.001*** -0.00065*** -0.00066*** -0.00066*** 
 [0.00003] [0.00003] [0.00003] [0.00003] [0.00003] [0.00003] [0.00003] 
Pastoral Sector        
number of working animals per holder -0.01565*** -0.0189*** -0.0184*** -0.01563*** -0.0121*** -0.011*** -0.0126*** 
 [0.00046] [0.00045] [0.00048] [0.00046] [0.00046] [0.00045] [0.00046] 
number of cattle per holder 0.0113*** 0.0127*** 0.0124*** 0.0117*** 0.0114*** 0.0097*** 0.0111*** 
 [0.00025] [0.00025] [0.0003] [0.00025] [0.00024] [0.00024] [0.00024] 
Social Strata        
percentage of 'cottagers' 0.169*** 0.17***  0.182*** 0.11*** 0.097*** 0.108*** 
 [0.0008] [0.0009]  [0.0009] [0.00121] [0.00123] [0.00121] 
percentage of 'smallholders' 0.302*** 0.296***  0.308*** 0.219*** 0.208*** 0.22*** 
 [0.001] [0.00101]  [0.00101] [0.00142] [0.00151] [0.00142] 
percentage of 'freemen'    0.199*** 0.1949*** 0.19991*** 0.195*** 
    [0.0014] [0.00139] [0.00138] [0.00139] 
percentage of Jews    0.93*** 0.82*** 2.89*** 0.82*** 
    [0.0009] [0.00145] [0.0086] [0.0014] 
percentage of ‘peasants’   -0.22***     
   [0.001]     
Other Village Characteristics        
presence of mill 0.3704*** 0.3703*** 0.368*** 0.371*** 0.368*** 0.363*** 0.367*** 
 [0.00134] [0.00133] [0.0014] [0.00131] [0.00131] [0.00129] [0.00131] 
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percentage of female household heads 0.0742*** 0.0635*** 0.0629*** 0.0629*** 0.0605*** 0.0448*** 0.057*** 
 [0.0033] [0.0034] [0.0039] [0.0035] [0.00354] [0.0036] [0.00357] 
presence of a town on estate -2.339*** -2.338*** -2.329*** -2.569*** -2.5439*** -2.5259*** -2.544*** 
 [0.00073] [0.00073] [0.00086] [0.00075] [0.00073] [0.00075] [0.00074] 
percentage of holders with less than 15 str of arable land    0.12*** 0.13*** 0.119*** 
     [0.00138] [0.00139] [0.00139] 
Second-Serfdom Proxies        
presence of a holding held/used by landlord  0.067*** 0.091*** 0.0915*** 0.0912*** 0.0925***   
 [0.00045] [0.00087] [0.00088] [0.00087] [0.00087]   
percentage of arable land held/used by landlord      0.224***  
      [0.003]  
number of holdings held/used by landlord       0.009*** 
       [0.00029] 
        
Constant 0.333*** 0.331*** 0.322*** 0.311*** 0.265*** 0.276*** 0.269*** 
 [0.00081] [0.00081] [0.00098] [0.00084] [0.00081] [0.00082] [0.00082] 
        
Estate Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
        
N 6836 6836 6836 6836 6836 6768 6836 
        
Log-likelihood value -1641.4 -1628.4 -1629.9 -1620.5 -1614.04 -1569.01 -1621.2 
Sigma 0.2816 0.28143 0.2809 0.2808 0.28005 0.2759 0.2804 
Pseudo-R
2 
0.463 0.467 0.4668 0.4699 0.472 0.475 0.4697 
Sources: see text        
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A second factor that had to be more deeply explored was the social composition of a 
village. The relative size of the three main social strata of peasants, smallholders and 
cottagers is widely regarded as an important indicator of local economic and social 
orientation in early modern Bohemia.30 Motivated by this consideration, the regression 
specifications in Table 5 columns 3, 4 and 5 undertook a closer investigation of the 
relationship between rural non-agricultural activity and village social structure. The 
specification in column 3 focuses on the ‘peasant’ strata, who had the most arable land and 
thus the greatest capacity to specialize in agricultural as opposed to non-agricultural 
occupations.31 The specification in column 4 includes the freemen and Jews, who would be 
expected to specialize in non-agricultural occupations, a frequent reason for their receiving 
manorial permits to settle on the estate. The specification in Table 5 column 5 controls for 
social structure in a different way, by including the variable registering the proportion of 
holdings with fewer than 15 strych (c. 4.3 hectares) of arable land, the minimum size 
necessary to support a family of average size solely from arable cultivation.32 In all cases, 
including these social-composition variables produces significant coefficients with the 
predicted signs – negative in the case of peasants, positive in the case of all other strata – and 
leave the significance and the magnitude of most other coefficients unchanged.33  
A third factor we explore more deeply through alternative specifications is the 
presence of the landlord. The specifications in Table 5 columns 1-5 captured landlord 
presence using only a simple dummy variable indicating whether at least one holding in the 
village was currently used by the landlord. The data, however, enable us to delve into 
landlord presence more deeply, since we also have information on the number and the size of 
holdings that were in landlord occupation. The regression specifications in columns 6 and 7 
explore the effect on occupational structure of these more precise measures of landlord 
presence in the village. We estimated all specifications reported in Table 5 columns 1-5 using 
these alternative measures of landlord presence, but columns 6 and 7 present only the 
specification in column 5, using the two alternative measures of landlord presence.34  
                                                        
30 Ogilvie and Cerman (1995); Cerman (1996). 
31 We exclude the social categories of ‘‘smallholder’ and cottager’ respectively because of multicollinearity with 
the social category of ‘peasant’.   
32 Mattmüller (1983), 42; Cerman (1996), 190. 
33 The only variables showing a non-trivial change in magnitude are those measuring social strata. This is 
understandable because the strata of smallholders and cottagers had smaller plots than the stratum of peasants, 
creating a collinearity with the percentage of holders having fewer than 15 strych of arable land. We re-
estimated that regression specification without the social strata categories and the results were similar. 
34 Other results are available from the authors upon request; they are very similar to the ones in columns 1-5. 
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Having explored specifications that take account of alternative measures of landlord 
presence, as well as differences in war damage and social stratification, we are now in a 
position to discuss our multivariate findings on the characteristics associated with rural non-
agricultural activity in this economy under the second serfdom.  
 
5. Economies of Agglomeration 
 
Changes in occupational structure in early modern Europe are widely regarded as 
resulting partly from increases in settlement size: a growth in the size of villages, creating 
larger pools of demand for secondary- and tertiary-sector goods; and the early modern 
urbanization of European societies in general, creating economies of agglomeration.35 
Intuitively appealing though this idea is, it still lacks theoretical underpinning or quantitative 
confirmation. In theory, both a larger size of rural settlements and the proximity of urban 
centres could have created economies of agglomeration: positive externalities in the form of 
improved information flow, specialization, division of labour, or the ability to attract more 
suppliers and customers. But the effect of such agglomeration economies on the density of 
non-agricultural activities in villages were multiple and could go in opposing directions.  
A first positive effect would be exercised by the size of the village itself. Holding 
other factors constant, one would expect larger village size to create agglomeration 
economies that encouraged non-agricultural occupations in the village, both by reducing 
production costs in such occupations and by increasing the demand for their products.  
A second effect, also positive, would be exercised by having a large settlement, 
particularly an urban centre, nearby: holding other factors constant, one might expect 
proximity to a town to increase density of non-agricultural occupations in a village if the 
town created a demand for rural goods and services (e.g. demand for rural spinning by urban 
weavers or for rural plank- and shingle-making by urban builders) or if the town exported 
urban consumption aspirations (e.g. by inspiring rural women to purchase small luxuries, 
creating demand for village shops).  This would be consistent with the theory of an early 
modern Consumer and Industrious Revolution after c. 1650, which is supposed to have seen a 
shift towards market participation by social groups that  had previously provisioned 
                                                        
35 See De Vries and Van der Woude (1997), 520ff; Van den Heuvel and Ogilvie (2013), 78-82. 
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themselves through household production. This would tend to increase the density of non-
agricultural activities in rural areas, where a larger percentage of inhabitants had traditionally 
engaged in self-provisioning because of access to land and livestock. 36  
A third effect of proximity to larger urban centres, by contrast, would be negative. 
The density of crafts and services in a nearby town might substitute for such non-agricultural 
activities in the village itself, whether because of production efficiencies or as a result of 
institutional privileges of town burghers entitling them to suppress rural competitors.  
The agglomeration economies for non-agricultural activities created by proximity to 
larger clusters of producers and consumers were therefore likely to depend both on whether 
such clusters were located in the village in question or in nearby settlements, and on whether 
nearby settlements complemented or substituted for local activities. Bohemia was much less 
urbanized than the northwest regions of Europe for which these hypotheses about early 
modern agglomeration economies were originally formulated. Bohemia had also suffered 
prolonged warfare and recent re-Catholicization which by 1654 had further depopulated both 
its villages and its towns, while enhancing the security benefits of urban centres. 
Furthermore, Bohemian towns possessed a number of institutional privileges entitling their 
guilded craftsmen and merchants to suppress rural competition to a degree no longer possible 
in north Atlantic economies such as the Netherlands or England by the mid-seventeenth 
century.37 Bohemia therefore provides a good laboratory for exploring the traction of 
hypotheses about agglomeration economies for early modern Europe beyond the north 
Atlantic societies. 
Our findings for Bohemia in 1654 show that village size, measured by the number of 
occupied holdings in the village, exercised a statistically significant positive effect on the 
intensity of non-agricultural activities locally. This finding is consistent with those for 
western Europe – the Netherlands, Flanders, England, and a variety of German territories – 
where recent studies have found settlement size to be associated with a significantly higher 
density of one specific non-agricultural activity, retailing.38 This suggests that in early 
modern Europe, local agglomeration economies – i.e. those exercised inside a particular 
settlement – were not restricted to urban centres, but also prevailed in villages. Moreover, it 
                                                        
36 De Vries (2008); Van den Heuvel and Ogilvie (2013).  
37 For concrete examples of urban coercion of rural craftsmen in seventeenth-century Bohemia, see Ogilvie 
(2001), 449-50. On the practical economic powers of urban privileges in different early modern societies, see 
Cerman and Ogilvie (1996); Ogilvie (2005c, 2007, 2011). 
38 Ogilvie (2010); Ogilvie, Küpker and Maegraith (2011); Van den Heuvel and Ogilvie (2013). 
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shows that this phenomenon was not restricted to western European societies but can also be 
observed in eastern-central Europe under the second serfdom. Simply increasing the size of 
rural settlements seems likely to have increased the density of non-agricultural activities, 
regardless of other facilitative or preventive pressures. This would lead one to predict an 
increasing density of non-agricultural activities as Bohemia underwent its gradual 
demographic recovery between the mid-seventeenth and early eighteenth century, regardless 
of the intensification of the second serfdom. This opens up avenues for future research into 
occupational structure as reflected, for example, in the Theresian Cataster of 1748-57.39  
By contrast, the influence of urban agglomeration economies on rural non-
agricultural activities, which in theory might be either positive or negative, emerges as 
strongly and significantly negative in the Bohemian context. In all specifications in Table 5, 
the presence of a town on the estate reduced the density of non-agricultural activities on the 
villages of that estate, even controlling for other characteristics of the estate and the villages 
in question. In Bohemia, at least, the presence of urban centres did not favour rural non-
agricultural activity but stifled it, indicating a competition effect between urban and rural 
areas.  
These findings help to flesh out early indications from the northwest corner of Europe 
for which the theories about early modern agglomeration economies were originally 
formulated. A recent econometric study of retail density in the early modern Netherlands, for 
instance, found that in the most successful and highly developed Dutch provinces, North and 
South Holland, urbanization did not stifle retail density in villages, but rather stimulated it. 
However, in the poorest Dutch provinces in the east of the country, where towns enjoyed 
greater institutional privileges compared to villages, there was a much wider gap in retail 
density between towns and villages, suggesting that in these provinces urban retail services 
substituted for village retailing.  
Bohemia was much more similar to the eastern than to the western Dutch provinces. 
Early modern Bohemian towns enjoyed considerable institutional privileges giving their 
craftsmen and merchants legal advantages over village competitors. In some Bohemian towns 
the inhabitants were not subject to serfdom at all; even in towns subject to serfdom, 
townsmen enjoyed institutional advantages denied to villagers. Townsmen often used their 
greater wealth, their municipal organs, and their guilds to lobby overlords for regulations 
                                                        
39 Chalupa et al. (1964). 
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protecting urban craftsmen and traders from rural competition. In the 1660s, for instance, the 
butchers’ guild of the Bohemian town of Frýdlant brought a peasant from a nearby village 
before the landlord’s court for violating the guilded butchers’ privileges by trading in cattle; 
the villager was sentenced to a large fine payable to the landlord, a smaller fine payable to the 
guild, and a prohibition against continuing his commercial activities.40 In the 1680s, likewise, 
the Frýdlant potters’ guild complained to the landlord’s court that an impoverished serf from 
a nearby village had been digging clay, building a kiln, and making pottery, ‘which is counter 
to the privileges which the guild possesses’; the manorial court punished the villager with a 
large fine.41 As late as the mid-eighteenth century, the Theresian Cadaster reported that 
villages around the Bohemian town of Cheb were prohibited from admitting any new 
inhabitants practising non-agricultural occupations; if villagers required non-agricultural 
products, even agricultural equipment, they were required to obtain it from craftsmen in the 
town. Weavers in villages near Cheb were also prohibited from operating a larger number of 
looms, which would have competed with town weavers.42 Although such urban lobbying was 
probably not always successful, town burghers evidently often secured at least some of their 
demands, enabling them to stifle rural crafts and commerce to some extent, if only by 
increasing their costs, imposing risks of prosecution, or pushing them into the black market.43 
Pressures such as these appear to have operated sufficiently strongly in Bohemia in 
1654 to counteract the stimulative effect on rural nonfarm activity which would be predicted 
by hypotheses about urban agglomeration economies based on richer and more highly 
developed regions of Europe. The findings for Bohemia, as for the eastern Netherlands, show 
that urbanization was not invariably a positive development indicator in early modern 
Europe. Certain types of urban centre could stifle the development of rural areas, and thus the 
productivity of large swathes of the pre-industrial population. This suggests caution in using 
the size of urban centres as a metric for pre-modern European economic growth in the 
absence of other development indicators. 
 
                                                        
40 Státní Oblastní Archiv Litomĕřice, Pobočka Dĕčín, Fond Rodinný Archiv Clam-Gallasů, Historická Sbírka, 
Kart. 80, Amtsprotokolle 1661-4, fol. 57, 01.08.1662. 
41
 Státní Oblastní Archiv Litomĕřice, Pobočka Dĕčín, Fond Rodinný Archiv Clam-Gallasů, Historická Sbírka, 2. 
část, dodatky (Frýdlant) 11, Amtsprotokolle 1685-7, fol. 31r, 24.04.1686. 
42 Chalupa et al. (1964), Svazek 1, Rustikál (Kraje A-Ch), 283. 
43 Ogilvie (2001), 449-50; Ogilvie (2005b). 
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6. Agicultural Characteristics 
 
Analyzing non-agricultural activities requires controlling for the characteristics of 
agriculture, which remained by far the most important sector of most early modern 
economies outside England and the Netherlands.44 Agriculture affects non-agricultural 
activity in two ways. Directly, it produces raw materials used in industries (flax and wool for 
weavers, grain for brewers and bakers, etc.) and goods traded by service-sector occupations 
(such as merchants and retailers). Given transport costs and institutional barriers (which may 
have been stronger in Bohemia because of the administrative autonomy of estates under 
different great landlords), local availability of such raw materials could lower input costs for 
secondary- and tertiary-sector activities. But agriculture also affects non-agricultural activity 
indirectly, by influencing opportunity costs – the costs in terms of foregone alternatives. 
Since the main alternative to industry and commerce was agriculture, the technological and 
geographical characteristics of farming in a locality contributed to shaping the costs of 
industry and trade in that locality. The opportunity cost (in terms of foregone agricultural 
income) of producing industrial raw materials was partly determined by local agricultural 
characteristics, and the productivity of agriculture influenced the opportunity cost of the 
labour supply to non-agricultural activities.45  
Motivated by these considerations, we included in our regression equation measures 
of  the agricultural characteristics of each village, relating to both the arable and the pastoral 
sector: the area of occupied arable land per holder; the number of working animals (oxen and 
horses) per holder; and the number of (non-working) cattle per holder. In theory, larger arable 
and pastoral resource endowments could create two countervailing effects on non-agricultural 
activities: a positive effect by generating plentiful and cheap local supplies of agricultural 
products for further industrial processing, trading, and transporting; and a negative effect by 
increasing the opportunity cost of allocating labour, land and capital to non-agricultural 
activities. The regression results in Table 5 show that the dominant effect was negative for 
arable production (as measured by the size of arable land and the number of working 
animals) but positive for pastoral production (as measured by the number of non-working 
cattle). 
                                                        
44 See Table 2 above; and De Vries and Van der Woude (1997), 525 (Table 11.3). 
45 See Ogilvie (1993) for a detailed discussion of the effect of agriculture on opportunity costs in proto-
industries. 
 
 
29
The potential for a negative relationship between arable farming and the density of 
non-agricultural activities is mentioned in some earlier Czech historiography.46 The argument 
put forward there focuses mainly on the decision-making of smallholders and cottagers: a 
small plot of arable land was not enough to provide a livelihood for the family, creating a 
need to engage in non-agricultural activity to obtain additional income. This is corroborated 
by the positive coefficients on the percentage of holders with less than fifteen strych of arable 
land and on the percentage of smallholders and cottagers. Opportunity cost considerations 
also explain the negative coefficient on the number of working animals (horses and oxen). 
These were the animals used to cultivate arable land, so in a village with more of them, fewer 
inhabitants would have incentives to look for an occupation outside agriculture. In addition, 
the institutional powers of landlords under the second serfdom required working animals to 
provide forced labour services on the landlord’s demesne, leaving their labour power 
unavailable to be exploited by serfs in non-agricultural occupations such as transport or 
commerce. However, it is striking that these three variables registering the importance of 
arable cultivation in the village all simultaneously show a statistically significant relationship 
with the intensity of non-agricultural activity, suggesting that they exercised independent 
effects on the incentives of villagers to move into alternative occupations. Opportunity cost 
considerations may have meant that in villages with lower endowments of arable land, even 
members of the ‘peasant’ stratum, who could have supported their families solely from 
farming, faced lower opportunity costs of engaging in non-agricultural activity because the 
alternative of devoting human and animal labour to cultivating larger tracts of arable land was 
not available to them.  
By contrast, pastoral agriculture, as measured by the number of (non-working) cattle, 
was positively associated with rural non-agricultural activity. This supports the hypothesis 
that pastoral production encouraged non-agricultural activities because animals were valuable 
inputs in diversifying into secondary- or tertiary-sector work, such as cheese-making, 
tanning, butchering, or trading in the cattle, leather and dairy products. These 
complementarities between pastoral agriculture and rural nonfarm activity evidently 
outweighed any tendency for the two activities to increase each other’s opportunity costs in 
terms of labour, land or capital deployment.  
                                                        
46 E.g. Petráň (1963) 
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These results have wider implications. First, the strong and pervasive negative 
relationship between arable agriculture and rural non-agricultural activity is consistent with 
the opportunity cost of inputs, particularly labour, playing an important role in determining 
the intensity of non-agricultural activities. That is, serfs’ time- and resource-allocation 
decisions took account of the opportunity cost of inputs in different activities. This finding 
would decisively refute any Chayanovian view that peasants in general (and eastern European 
serfs in particular) lacked the concept of wage, did not calculate the cost of land, rejected 
credit and interest on loans, or ascribed a ‘subjective’ value rather than a money price to their 
time.47  
Second, these findings establish definitively that the relationship between non-
agricultural activity and the other explanatory variables holds even when agricultural 
characteristics are controlled for. That is, non-agricultural work was not merely something 
that serfs fell back upon when they could not earn a living from agriculture, but was instead a 
positive choice they took in response to other aspects of their constraint structure. 
 
7. Social Structure 
 
Bohemia, like many parts of early modern central and eastern Europe, was a society 
in which each member of the rural population had a legally designated social status. This 
status was assigned according to whether the individual (or the head of his or her household) 
held landed property, and what the legal status and manorial burdens of that property were. 
Generally, a person changed social status when his or her household changed its landholding, 
although outsiders such as Jews could not change legal status. Although terminology varied, 
and there were some overlaps between strata, nearly every settled inhabitant of the Bohemian 
countryside was a member of a household belonging to one of the following groups: peasant, 
smallholder, or cottager.  
At the top were the ‘peasants’ (Czech sedlák or rolník, German Bauer), who typically 
held enough arable land to live entirely from farming (i.e., over 4-5 hectares), owed the 
highest feudal dues and state taxes, and had to perform the largest amount of regular labour 
                                                        
47 On this view, see for instance, Chayanov (repr. 1986); Kriedte, Medick and Schlumbohm (1981); Thomas and 
Znaniecki (1958). For a critical consideration of this view using qualitative data on early modern Bohemian 
serfs, see Ogilvie (2001). 
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services, in principle with draft animals but also sometimes with human labour. Then came a 
stratum of smallholders (Czech zahradník, German Gärtner), who held some arable land but 
usually not enough to survive on (generally less than 5 hectares), owed lower dues and taxes, 
and rendered services with human labour only. The lowest stratum of independent holdings 
were those of the cottagers (Czech chalupník, German Häusler), who held only their own 
cottages surrounded perhaps by a kitchen-garden, owed some dues and taxes, and had to 
perform services with human labour only, and at a lower level than the two higher strata.  
All other serfs lived in the households of members of these three strata, either as 
family members, as servants, or as inmate-lodgers (Czech podruh, German Hausleute or 
Hausgenoßen). An inmate-lodger might even be married and have childeren, but he or she 
lived on a holding owned by a peasant, a smallholder, or a cottager, either in a separate 
building or in lodgings within the building occupied by the main household. The more 
economically independent among the inmate-lodger stratum were increasingly obliged to pay 
dues to the manor and carry out labour services or compulsory wage-labour on demand, but 
were not regarded as independent householders.  
Outside these four groups – peasants, smallholders, cottagers, and inmate-lodgers – 
there dwelt in Bohemian villages a few scattered individuals who did not belong to any serf 
stratum. The two most common types were the freeman (Czech svobodník, German 
Freibauer), who had a status similar to that of a free farmer in a non-serf society; and the Jew 
(Czech žid, German Jude), who was tolerated in Bohemian rural society under legal 
‘privileges’ purchased from the crown and from the overlord of the estate. In addition, there 
were some members of a few professions – some pastors, village clerks, schoolmasters, and 
millers – who were not members of the basic serf strata, but were also not freemen or Jews. 
Those with no recorded social stratum, however, made up a tiny proportion of the Bohemian 
rural population in 1654.  
The terminology used to describe these different strata and different sub-strata within 
them varied across different estates, different villages in the same estate, and even across time 
in the same village. The peasants could be divided into full- (or draft-) peasants (who had 
larger holdings and carried out their labour services for the landlord with draft animals) and 
half- (or hand-) peasants (who had smaller holdings and rendered their manorial services with 
human labour), as well as into peasants who owed services to the manor, to the church, or to 
the village headman. The smaller hand-peasants might shade over into the larger 
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smallholders. The smallholders could be divided into hereditary- (or field-) smallholders who 
had larger holdings, which may have been hived off from peasant holdings; and commons-
smallholders whose holdings generally included less arable land and had been formed by 
enclosing plots on the village commons. The cottagers could be divided into commons-
cottagers whose holdings were also created by enclosing plots from the commons, riverside-
cottagers whose holdings encroached on the meadowland along waterways, and ordinary 
cottagers whose holdings were created from land whose origins had been forgotten. The 
inmate-lodgers often subdivided into two groups. The upper (and smaller) group occupied 
separate dwellings (albeit on holdings belonging to members of other strata) and pursued 
independent livelihoods, often with families of their own; they were occasionally listed as 
independent units by the manor, to which they delivered some minor dues and services, and 
were sometimes (though not always) given the designation ‘lodgers with houses’. This was to 
distinguish them from the lower (and more numerous) stratum of true lodgers, who occupied 
rooms in households headed by peasants, smallholders and cottagers. These true lodgers 
sometimes had spouses and offspring, but were not usually economically independent enough 
to be regarded by the manor as able to pay dues. As far as actual property-ownership was 
concerned, there was some overlap between each of the social groups except for the inmate-
lodgers who did not own real estate. But the legal definition of the holding’s stratum, and the 
associated economic obligations and privileges, were not correspondingly fluid: they were 
legally fixed.48 
This means that social stratum in early modern Bohemia was not, as in western 
Europe, defined economically (in terms of landholding or occupation) or socioculturally (in 
terms of education, speech or consumption habits), but institutionally and legally, within the 
framework of the manorial system. The initial allocation of landholdings at the foundation of 
a Bohemian village, the number of centuries during which generations of non-inheriting 
offspring or in-migrants exerted pressure to carve out smallholdings or cottager holdings in 
the interstices of communal and manorial regulation, the varying incentives of different types 
of overlord (e.g. minor knights compared to great noble seigneurs) to permit or compel the 
settlement of sub-peasant strata, and even the differing manorial strategies pursued in 
neighbouring domains under the same overlord, are thought to have influenced the social 
                                                        
48 For more detail on the social strata in early modern Bohemian villages, see Ogilvie and Cerman (1995); 
Cerman (1996); and Cerman and Zeitlhofer (2002). 
 
 
33
composition observed in each Bohemian village by the mid-seventeenth century.49 As a 
consequence, the relative size of the three main legally defined social strata within a 
Bohemian village in 1654 can be regarded as a variable that was in the short term 
exogenously imposed on that village, rather than chosen by the householders concerned, and 
hence as a measure of the opportunities and constraints faced by its inhabitants.  
Rural social structure, as measured by the relative size of these institutionally defined 
social strata, is regarded as an important indicator of the economic and social orientation of 
villages in early modern Bohemia, as well as in other eastern-central European societies 
subject to strong manorialism.50 Traditional Czech historiography argued that a 
preponderance of ‘sub-peasant’ strata (i.e. smallholders, cottagers, and inmate-lodgers) made 
a village more likely to move into proto-industrial activities such as linen-weaving since such 
people lacked other means of supporting their families. However, Cerman’s study of the 
Bohemian estates of Frýdlant and Liberec showed that it was initially peasants, members of 
the upper rural stratum, who were the dominant participants in rural linen production; later, 
when rural spinning and weaving became primarily an occupation practised by smallholders 
and cottagers, it remained a pursuit only of a minority of these sub-peasants, who were reliant 
on a variety of other livelihoods, many of them agricultural, especially work as farm 
labourers for larger peasants.51 It therefore remains an open question whether a village with 
larger strata of smallholders and cottagers was likely to have a higher or lower intensity of 
non-agricultural activity.  
To investigate this question, the regression specifications in Table 5 columns 3 and 4 
explored the relationship between different measures of village social composition on the one 
hand and the intensity of rural non-agricultural activity on the other. The specification in 
column 3 focused on the stratum of peasants, and found that a higher proportion of peasants 
in the village was negatively related to the intensity of non-agricultural activity there.52 
Column 4 included the social categories of freemen and Jews and found that they were 
positively associated with rural non-agricultural activities. This is consistent with the 
institutional status of these ‘outsider’ strata: freemen were allowed to practise any 
occupation, and were sometimes granted permits to live on Bohemian estates precisely 
                                                        
49 Ogilvie and Cerman (1995); Cerman (1996). 
50 See the literature surveyed in Cerman (1996, 2002, 2012). 
51
 See especially Cerman (1996). 
52 We exclude the variables measuring the size of the ‘smallholder’ and ‘cottager’ strata because of 
multicollinearity with the size of the ‘peasant’ stratum.   
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because they had craft or service skills unavailable locally; Jews, by contrast, were forbidden 
to practise agriculture so they had to engage in non-agricultural activities. In all cases, 
including these social-composition variables left the statistical significance of other variables 
unchanged. This confirms the predictions of the traditional historiography: although non-
agricultural occupations were practised by all social strata in early modern Bohemia, holding 
other village characteristics constant such occupations were practised to a greater degree in 
villages with a higher proportion of sub-peasant or outsider strata. 
It might be argued that the positive link between a sub-peasant social composition and 
the density of non-agricultural activity in a village simply reflects lack of agricultural land on 
the part of the smallholders and cottagers, and does not relate to the legal or institutional 
aspects of their social status. But doubt is cast on this idea by the regression specification in 
Table 5 column 5 which controls for the proportion of holdings in the village with fewer than 
15 strych of arable fields, the minimum necessary to support a family of average size solely 
from arable cultivation.53 The coefficient on this variable shows the expected positive 
relationship with the percentage of non-agricultural occupations, and leaves the significance 
and the magnitude of almost all other explanatory variables virtually unchanged. The ‘social 
strata’ variables (percentage of cottagers and percentage of smallholders) are the only ones 
that show a non-trivial change in magnitude when this farm size variable is included. This is 
understandable because the smallholder and cottager strata had smaller plots of land than the 
peasant stratum, creating collinearity with the percentage of holders with less than 15 strych 
of arable land. 54 However, although including the percentage of holdings with less than 15 
strych changes the magnitude of the coefficients on the percentage of smallholders and 
cottagers, it does not render them statistically insignificant. Both sets of variables continue to 
show significant positive relationships with the density of non-agricultural activity in a 
village, even controlling for one another. This is not wholly surprising since, as discussed 
above, the social composition of a village did not simply register the distribution of 
landholdings of different size, but rather reflected a conglomeration of institutional and 
historical characteristics of the village. Confirmation of the quasi-exogenous impact of 
village social composition on the opportunities and constraints of serfs is provided by the fact 
that both the percentage of sub-peasant strata and the percentage of smaller landholdings in 
                                                        
53 Mattmüller (1983), 42; Cerman (1996), 190. 
54 We re-estimated that regression specification without social strata categories and the results were similar. 
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the village showed an independent positive association with the intensity of non-agricultural 
activities there. 
 
8. Village Mills 
 
Water-driven mills were a major source of energy in the pre-industrial economy, 
which otherwise relied on the organic energy provided by human labourers and draft animals. 
Mills had an advantage over human and animal labour in that they provided larger and more 
continuous energy supplies and were therefore particularly suitable for energy-intensive 
activities. Although watermills were most commonly used to grind grain into flour, they were 
also important for a wide variety of other activities: cracking the husks of malted barley and 
other grains to brew beer, cutting logs into planks, fulling woollen cloths, tanning leather, 
driving hammers for iron forges, running blast furnaces, crushing iron and other metal ores, 
slitting bars of iron into rods, sharpening tools, pressing oil out of hemp and other seeds, 
pulping rags for paper, and driving bellows for smithies. Even mills that were solely used to 
grind grain into flour or crack the husks of brewing grains tended to attract ancillary non-
agricultural activities, especially transportation services, brewing, and baking, which 
benefited from proximity to cheap sources of energy and processed grain. But the capacity of 
watermills to be used as energy sources meant that they typically attracted a very broad array 
of industrial, transportation, and commercial activities.  
Motivated by these considerations, we included in our regressions a dummy variable 
registering the presence or absence of a mill in the village. Although the Berní Rula did not 
usually record the specific purpose for which a village mill was used, there was firm 
justification for expecting a positive association between the presence of a mill and the 
intensity of non-agricultural activities in a village since, as we shall discuss shortly, there is 
considerable evidence in the secondary literature that in Bohemia, as in other pre-modern 
European economies, water-driven mills were used for a wide variety of purposes in addition 
to processing grain. 
This hypothesis was confirmed by our econometric analysis, as Table 5 reveals. The 
presence of a mill was positively and significantly associated with the intensity of non-
agricultural activities in the village, controlling for most other village characteristics. The 
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only exception, as we shall see shortly, was the presence in the village of holdings currently 
used by the landlord, which significantly altered the impact of the presence of a mill in ways 
that illuminate the concrete operations of the second serfdom in Bohemia. 
 
9. Female Headship 
 
The same emerges for a further important variable, the female household headship 
rate. Many studies suggest a positive relationship between the intensity of non-agricultural 
activities and women’s economic autonomy. The most widely employed indicator of female 
autonomy, which has been used successfully to analyze early modern societies as diverse as 
early modern Bohemia, England, Germany and the Netherlands, is the percentage of 
independent households headed by women. In a number of historical studies, female 
household headship has been found to manifest a positive association with various types of 
secondary- and tertiary-sector activity.55 However, although the historiography universally 
suggests a positive link between non-agricultural activity and female headship, it is less clear 
about the causal relationship.  
On the one hand, it is possible that high female autonomy exerted a positive causal 
influence on the local intensity of non-agricultural activities. Although contemporaries often 
deplored the existence of households headed by women, and urged the propriety of all 
households being headed by both a ‘house-father’ and a ‘house-mother’, with gender-specific 
economic roles, in practice they acknowledged the demographic realities of frequent and 
early widowhood and the fact that some widows might fail to remarry. In that unfortunate 
situation, they commonly described women as unsuited to agriculture and advocated crafts 
and small-scale trading as best suited for the weaker sex. A second reason to expect a positive 
association between female headship and non-agricultural activities is that women may have 
been relatively productive in industrial and commercial activities because these could be 
more often be carried out in domestic locations and thus combined more easily with 
household production (especially child care, an important consideration for widows). 
Physical differences between the sexes are also thought to have played a role, with men 
specializing in activities such as agriculture which require greater upper-body strength while 
                                                        
55 For studies using this measure, see Ogilvie and Edwards (2000) on Bohemia; Ogilvie (2003) on Germany; 
Van den Heuvel and Ogilvie (2013) on the Netherlands; and Todd (1994) on England. 
 
 
37
women specialized in crafts and commerce requiring endurance, dexterity, communication or 
calculation skills. For these reasons, if female headship was high in a village for exogenous 
reasons (e.g. warfare or gender-specific emigration diminishing the number of marriageable 
males), this might have increased the density of non-agricultural activities there.  
But causation might also go in the opposite direction. If the intensity of non-
agricultural activities was high for exogenous reasons – the ones we seek to identify in this 
paper – that might have increased female headship by enabling more women to support 
families independently.  
Furthermore, underlying factors might have facilitated both female headship and non-
agricultural activity: more flexible institutions could have removed barriers both to women 
seeking to support themselves independently in all occupations (not just non-agricultural 
ones) and to all economic agents (not just women) in seeking to undertake non-agricultural 
activities.  
The econometric problems created by these two-way causal links could not be solved 
using an instrumental variable (one correlated with female headship but not with the 
percentage of holders practising non-agricultural occupations) because the determinants of 
female headship rates in pre-industrial societies are still not fully understood.  Our alternative 
solution was to estimate our regressions with and without the female headship variable in order 
to establish whether female autonomy was significantly associated with the percentage of 
non-agricultural activities and whether any such association was positive or negative. Taking 
female headship into account hardly altered the estimated coefficients on other variables, 
justifying this approach. The only exception was when we interacted female headship with 
measures of landlord presence in the village, the effect of which we discuss in the next 
section. 
The average female headship rate across the entire data set for Bohemia in 1654 was 
just over 3 per cent. This is much lower than the 10-15 per cent normally observed in western 
European rural settlements, but lies in the range observed in other studies of eastern-central 
European societies in this period, including Bohemia.56  However, there was also 
considerable variation: in some of these early modern Bohemian rural settlements over 8 per 
cent of households were headed by women, while in others no households had female heads.  
                                                        
56 Ogilvie and Edwards (2000), esp. 971 (Table 2). 
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The econometric analysis established that female headship was indeed positively 
related to the percentage of holders practising non-agricultural occupations. As Table 5 
shows, in all regression specifications – i.e., controlling for all other village characteristics – 
higher female headship was associated with a significantly higher percentage of holders 
practising non-agricultural occupations. Our findings for Bohemia are thus consistent with 
those for other early modern European economies which have revealed the existence of a 
positive association between female headship and the density of non-agricultural occupations. 
Indeed, our findings strengthen that conclusion by confirming that it holds even controlling 
for settlement size, agricultural structure, social composition, and other village 
characteristics. It also shows that this positive association prevailed not just in economically 
advanced western Europe but also under the second serfdom which, as has emerged from 
other studies and will be discussed shortly, often acted to reduce female household 
headship.57  
This opens up perspectives for deeper micro-level analyses to investigate gender-
specific patterns of non-agricultural activity at the household level. Such investigations in 
turn may help resolve the endogeneity between the two variables, i.e., whether female 
headship increased the density of non-agricultural activity or vice versa. In any case, there is 
now little doubt that there was a significant, systematic, and pervasive association between 
the expansion of non-agricultural activities in early modern European rural societies and 
women’s economic autonomy, even controlling for other factors.  
 
10. The Second Serfdom 
 
One of the most prominent of these factors is the second serfdom, the institutional 
framework within which inhabitants of early modern rural Bohemia made their economic 
decisions. From the sixteenth century through to serf emancipation in 1781, Bohemian 
landlords expanded demesne operations, increased their extraction of money rents and labour 
dues, extended them to previously exempt social groups, levied new dues on activities such 
as rural crafts, proto-industries, commerce and forestry, set up market monopolies, and 
expanded their institutional interventions in the economic and demographic decisions of their 
                                                        
57 For quantitative and qualitative evidence concerning this negative relationship in early modern Bohemia, see 
Ogilvie and Edwards (2000), 980-9. 
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rural subjects. These developments can already be observed in parts of Bohemia from the 
mid-sixteenth century onwards, are thought to have intensified during and after the Thirty 
Years War (1618-1648), and endured until emancipation in the later eighteenth century; some 
of the institutional powers of the great landlords over the rural population outlasted the 1781 
emancipation patent and survived well into the first half of the nineteenth century.58  
The rich historiography on the second serfdom is deeply divided concerning its 
impact on occupational structure. On the one hand, as discussed in the introduction, 
traditional ‘manorial dominance’ views argue that under serfdom landlords stifled non-
agricultural activities altogether.59 On the other, a revisionist strand of scholarship has 
contended that the second serfdom did not constrain serf choices. One variant of this 
revisionist approach, which one might call the ‘serf autonomy’ view, argues that under 
serfdom landlords were largely unable to control economic or demographic decisions inside 
serf villages and hence did not affect economic activity there.60 Another variant of the 
revisionist strand of scholarship goes so far as to argue that eastern European economies 
under serfdom were actually just as dynamic as western European economies where peasants 
were free: entrepreneurial landlords often actively encouraged industrial and commercial 
enterprises.61 A more recent, ‘institutional’ approach argues for replacing a priori 
assumptions about serfdom with a rigorous analysis of how the specific constraints imposed 
by different manifestations of serfdom affected the incentives of serfs, overlords, and village 
communities.62 This approach would predict that although the overarching institutional 
framework of serfdom tended to distort resource allocation in ways that stifled broader 
economic growth, certain institutional rules within the system of serfdom entitled landlords to 
extract rents from particular non-agricultural activities, which they therefore had incentives to 
encourage. 
                                                        
58 For a recent survey of the literature, with a detailed consideration of the economic impact of these institutional 
constraints, see Klein (2013). 
59 See, for instance, Kriedte, Medick and Schlumbohm (1977). 
60 For a critical analysis of the ‘communal autonomy’ view of Bohemian serfdom, see Ogilvie (2005a). 
61 For a recent exposition of the ‘revisionist’ approach to serfdom, see Cerman (2012). 
62 For an exposition of this ‘institutional’ approach to serfdom in the context of Bohemia, Germany, Russia, and 
England, see Ogilvie (2013); Klein (2013); Dennison (2013); and Briggs (2013). 
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10.1. The Econometric Findings 
 
This continuing debate about the second serfdom motivated our search for ways of 
exploring its economic effects. The historiography suggests that although the legal definition 
of serfdom was homogeneous across early modern Bohemia, how these institutional rules 
were implemented in practice could vary significantly. One possibility is that the presence of 
the landlord using or occupying one or more holdings in the village might be a proxy measure 
of the intensity of manorial interest, information, and potential control over the serfs’ 
economic decisions in that village. However, to interpret this proxy measure of local 
institutions properly it is important to recognize the complexities it raises. 
The first complexity arises from the general difficulty of measuring institutional 
constraints quantitatively. The precise ways in which landlords regulated serfs’ economic 
activities and the powers they had to enforce their regulations varied enormously. 
Quantitatively exploring the significance of a variable registering the presence or absence of 
‘the landlord’ using or occupying a holding in the village is better than having no quantitative 
measure at all of the ‘second serfdom’. But it does not reveal the details of the economic 
impact of landlord powers within the village. In particular, the Berní Rula contains no 
concrete information on how the landlord was using or occupying village holdings, the type 
of personnel (if any) he might have appointed to exercise this use or occupancy, the degree to 
which such personnel were able to monitor or control serfs’ activities, or the incentives those 
personnel might have had to exercise such control.63 
The second complexity arises from the fact that, as already mentioned, landlord 
presence in village holdings measures the second serfdom at the ‘intensive margin’ (stronger 
versus weaker enforcement of an existing institutional system) but not the ‘extensive margin’ 
(presence or absence of the institutional system altogether). In other words, this variable does 
not make it possible to compare Bohemian villages with and without the second serfdom, but 
rather only to draw comparisons among villages which were all subject to the second 
serfdom, some of which may have experienced more intensive direct monitoring and control 
than others. This variable can capture only those effects of the second serfdom which 
depended on direct local enforcement inside villages. It cannot measure those effects of the 
                                                        
63 The one exception is that the Berní Rula records, for all holdings in the village (including those currently 
being held or used by the landlord), whether land is under arable cultivation or lying unused; this indicates that 
the arable portion of such holdings was being used by the landlord for arable cultivation. 
 
 
41
second serfdom that were generated by more general institutional constraints on factor 
markets, product markets, or demographic decisions, which depended on manorial 
enforcement that was implemented outside an individual settlement, for instance through the 
manorial court, manorial administrators, manorial tax-collectors, or demesne foremen. Nor, 
of course, can it capture those aspects of the second serfdom implemented via collaboration 
among landlords or enforcement by the state.64 
The third complexity arises from the probability that the presence of the landlord in a 
village had a two-way relationship with non-agricultural activity there. On the one hand, 
landlord presence could affect non-agricultural activity by hindering or encouraging serfs in 
practising such occupations. But conversely, an existing cluster of non-agricultural activities 
could attract the landlord to use or occupy holdings in the village, with the aim of extorting 
rents from them. This creates a serious problem of endogeneity, which cannot be solved by 
instrumental variables since the determinants of variations in the intensity of the second 
serfdom or the presence of landlords in serf villages are not well understood. We therefore 
estimated the regressions with and without the variables measuring landlord presence, as well 
as using several alternative measures of such presence, in order to investigate how robust the 
relationship was to different specifications and how it affected the coefficients on other 
variables. We also used interaction terms to try to shed light on the endogeneity issue. The 
results enable us to characterize the complex relationship between landlords and serfs’ 
occupational decisions more clearly, while still leaving a number of open questions for future 
research.  
The traditional ‘manorial dominance’ approach to serfdom, at least in its more 
extreme manifestations, is refuted by our findings. Mid-seventeenth-century Bohemia was no 
autarkic or purely agricultural economy in which landlords stifled all rural nonfarm activity. 
On the contrary, as we have seen, the Berní Rula recorded an array of non-agricultural 
activities covering the entire spectrum from locally-oriented crafts, to proto-industries 
exporting to supra-regional markets, to retail trades, and even to merchant commerce. Rural 
nonfarm activity was less widespread than in western Europe but not stifled altogether. 
However, the revisionist ‘serf autonomy’ view, according to which landlords were 
unable to affect economic life inside serf villages, is also refuted by our findings. The 
                                                        
64 For a consideration of the wider growth impact of the second serfdom in Bohemia and other parts of eastern-
central Europe, see Klein (2013); and Ogilvie (2013). 
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econometric analysis shows a significant association between non-agricultural activity and 
landlord use of holdings in a village, controlling for other village characteristics. Table 5 
column 1, the simplest specification, already showed that the presence of at least one holding 
in the village occupied or used by the landlord was associated with a significantly higher 
intensity of non-agricultural activity by the inhabitants of the village. This result became 
more striking in the specification in column 2, which controlled for the percentage of empty 
holdings in the village on the grounds that the use of an empty holding by a landlord might 
also be picking up the effect of the war. This specification showed that the percentage of 
empty holdings was negatively related to the percentage of non-agricultural occupations in a 
village, and caused the magnitude of the relationship between non-agricultural activity and 
the landlord presence variable to increase non-trivially.65 The significantly positive 
relationship between non-agricultural activity and landlord presence is also observable in the 
specifications in Table 5 columns 3-5, which (as discussed in Section 8 above) control for 
different measures of village social structure.  
Up to this point, we restricted ourselves to capturing landlord presence using only a 
simple dummy variable indicating the presence or absence of at least one holding used by the 
landlord. The data, however, enabled us to delve more deeply into landlord presence, since 
we also have information on the number and the size of holdings occupied by the landlord. 
The regression specifications in Table 5 columns 6 and 7 explore the relationship between 
non-agricultural activity and these more precise measures of landlord presence. We estimated 
all specifications reported in Table 5 columns 1-5 using these alternative measures of 
landlord presence, but present only the specification in column 5.66 The overall picture 
remained unchanged, regardless of which proxy we used, although the estimated coefficients 
unsurprisingly varied in magnitude. Specifically, the percentage of the village’s arable land 
occupied by the landlord had the largest estimated association with percentage of households 
engaged in non-agricultural occupations, while the number of holdings occupied by the 
landlord had the smallest estimated relationship. But all three measures of the intensity of 
landlord presence in the village were positively and significantly associated with a higher 
density of non-agricultural activities there.  
                                                        
65 The estimated coefficients of the variables in the category ‘other village characteristics’ also changed their 
magnitudes, which indicates that they were also picking up the effect of empty holdings in the village, further 
corroborating the importance of controlling for it.  
66 Other results are available from the authors upon request; they are very similar to the ones in columns 1-5. 
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It might superficially seem that the positive relationship between non-agricultural 
activity and landlord presence in 1654 provides support for the second variant of the 
revisionist approach to serfdom, according to which serfdom was no barrier to economic 
dynamism since landlords in fact encouraged serf enterprises. But deeper analysis shows that 
the interrelationship between landlord presence and rural nonfarm activity was far more 
complex.  
A first complexity arises when one examines whether the association between non-
agricultural activity and landlord presence was actually a simple linear one. To explore 
whether the positive coefficient in Table 5 was merely a snapshot of one part of a curvilinear 
relationship, Table 6 presents the results of introducing into the regression specifications in 
Table 5 columns 6-7 two alternative quadratic terms: the square of the percentage of arable 
land held or used by the landlord; and the square of the number of holdings held or used by 
the landlord. It turns out that the association between non-agricultural activity and landlord 
presence was indeed non-linear, since the quadratic terms are negative and statistically 
significant. Whereas a certain degree of landlord presence in the village was positively 
associated with non-agricultural activities, once landlord presence reached a certain point the 
relationship turned negative.  
A second set of complexities emerges when we delve more deeply into the 
interactions between landlord presence and two other village characteristics which previous 
studies of early modern Bohemia suggest were strongly affected by landlords’ interventions: 
female household headship67 and the presence of water-driven mills.68  To this end, we 
estimated the regression specification in Table 5 column 5, but with the addition of 
interaction terms between landlord presence and female headship, as well as landlord 
presence and village mills. The results, presented in Table 7, show that the original 
explanatory variables retain similar statistical significance and magnitudes to the ones they 
have in Table 5, providing further reassurance of their robustness. Landlord presence shows 
an overall positive relationship with non-agricultural activity, but the interaction terms are 
negative. On their own, both landlord presence and female headship were associated with an 
increase in non-agricultural activity, but when the landlord was using holdings in the village 
female headship was linked to a decrease in non-agricultural employment. Likewise, on their 
own both landlord presence and village mills were positively associated with non-agricultural 
                                                        
67 Ogilvie and Edwards (2000). 
68 Maur (1976), 44-5; Maur (1990), 109-12. 
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Table 6: Regression Analysis with Second-Serfdom Non-Linear Terms (Tobit Model) 
 (1) (2) 
Size of Village   
number of holdings 0.0053*** 0.0054*** 
 [0.00002] [0.00002] 
percentage of empty holdings -0.173*** -0.169*** 
 [0.0025] [0.0017] 
Arable Sector   
total arable land on occupied holdings per holder -0.00067*** -0.00065*** 
 [0.00003] [0.00003] 
Pastoral Sector   
number of working animals per holder -0.0112*** -0.0119*** 
 [0.00045] [0.00046] 
number of cattle per holder 0.0097*** 0.011*** 
 [0.0002] [0.0002] 
Social Strata   
percentage of 'cottagers' 0.097*** 0.111*** 
 [0.00124] [0.00121] 
percentage of 'smallholders' 0.208*** 0.221*** 
 [0.0016] [0.0014] 
percentage of 'freemen' 0.199*** 0.195*** 
 [0.00138] [0.00138] 
percentage of Jews 2.89*** 0.825*** 
 [0.009] [0.0014] 
Other Village Characteristics   
presence of mill 0.363*** 0.368*** 
 [0.0013] [0.00132] 
percentage of female household heads 0.044*** 0.053*** 
 [0.0038] [0.0035] 
presence of a town on estate -2.525*** -2.543*** 
 [0.00074] [0.00074] 
percentage of holders with less than 15 str of arable land 0.131*** 0.119*** 
 [0.00139] [0.00139] 
Second-Serfdom Proxies   
percentage of arable land held/used by landlord 0.301***  
 [0.026]  
(percentage of arable land held/used by landlord)
2 
-0.124***  
 [0.032]  
number of holdings held/used by landlord  0.047*** 
  [0.0011] 
(number of holdings held/used by landlord)
2 
 -0.005*** 
  [0.0001] 
   
Constant 0.276*** 0.267*** 
 [0.00082] [0.00082] 
   
Estate Dummies YES YES 
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N 6768 6836 
   
Log-likelihood value -1568.9 -1616.1 
Sigma 0.276 0.280 
Pseudo-R
2 
0.475 0.471 
Sources: see text   
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Table 7: Regression Analysis with Second-Serfdom Interactions (Tobit Model) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Size of Village    
number of holdings 0.00529*** 0.00529*** 0.00538*** 
 [0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00002] 
percentage of empty holdings -0.179*** -0.172*** -0.164*** 
 [0.0018] [0.002] [0.0017] 
Arable Sector    
total arable land on occupied holdings per 
holder 
-0.00065*** -0.00066*** -0.00066*** 
[0.00003] [0.00003] [0.00003] 
    
Pastoral Sector    
number of working animals per holder -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.0122*** 
 [0.00045] [0.00045] [0.00046] 
number of cattle per holder 0.011*** 0.0097*** 0.011*** 
 [0.00024] [0.00024] [0.00024] 
Social Strata    
percentage of 'cottagers' 0.111*** 0.097*** 0.109*** 
 [0.00121] [0.00123] [0.00121] 
percentage of 'smallholders' 0.219*** 0.207*** 0.2205*** 
 [0.00142] [0.0015] [0.00142] 
percentage of 'freemen' 0.191*** 0.199*** 0.193*** 
 [0.00138] [0.00137] [0.00138] 
percentage of Jews 0.832*** 2.887*** 0.824*** 
 [0.001] [0.009] [0.0014] 
Other Village Characteristics    
presence of mill 0.376*** 0.367*** 0.372*** 
 [0.0014] [0.00137] [0.0013] 
percentage of female household heads 0.087*** 0.058*** 0.072*** 
 [0.005] [0.0046] [0.0042] 
presence of a town on estate -2.54*** -2.53*** -2.546*** 
 [0.00073] [0.00074] [0.00073] 
percentage of holders with less than 15 strych 
of arable land 
0.12*** 0.13*** 0.119*** 
[0.00138] [0.00139] [0.00139] 
    
Second-Serfdom Proxies with Interactions    
presence of mill x presence of a holding 
held/used by landlord 
-0.13***   
[0.0057] 
  
percentage of female household heads x  
presence of a holding held/used by landlord 
-0.36***   
[0.038] 
  
presence of a holding held/used by landlord  
0.115***   
[0.0019]   
    
presence of mill x percentage of arable land 
held/used by landlord 
 -0.217***  
 [0.022]  
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percentage of female household heads x 
percentage of arable land held/used by 
landlord 
 -0.96***  
 [0.13] 
 
percentage of arable land held/used by 
landlord  
 0.258***  
 [0.005]  
    
    
presence of mill x number of holdings 
held/used by landlord 
  -0.029*** 
  [0.0014] 
percentage of female household heads x 
number of holdings held/used by landlord 
  -0.128*** 
  [0.0137] 
number of holdings held/used by landlord    0.0223*** 
   [0.0007] 
    
Constant 0.262*** 0.275*** 0.267*** 
 [0.00081] [0.00082] [0.00082] 
    
Estate Dummies YES YES YES 
    
N 6836 6768 6836 
    
Log-likelihood value -1611.6 -1568.05 -1619.14 
Sigma 0.279 0.276 0.2803 
Pseudo-R2 0.473 0.476 0.4704 
Sources: see text    
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activity, but when the landlord was using village holdings the association between non-
agricultural activity and milling turned negative. 
Landlord presence thus manifested a complex and multi-faceted relationship with 
occupational structure under the second serfdom. The superficially positive association was 
in fact only the initial upward slope of an inverted-U relationship, with a small degree of 
landlord presence associated with greater non-agricultural activity but greater landlord 
presence associated with less. Furthermore, landlord presence reversed the positive 
relationship between non-agricultural activities and two of its major correlates, female 
headship and the presence of mills.  
Qualitative and institutional evidence on Czech economic history helps explain these 
findings. Bohemian landlords engaged in a wide array of institutional interventions in the 
rural economy under the second serfdom, gathering force from the second half of the 
sixteenth century onwards, but intensifying during and after the Thirty Years War, when loss 
of population, declining agricultural prices, and rising wages put pressure on the profitability 
of landlords’ estates. At least four types of manorial intervention had the potential to affect 
rural nonfarm activity by serfs, both positively and negatively: direct manorial involvement 
in industrial enterprises using serf labour; permitting serfs to engage in crafts and commerce 
in return for paying dues; granting of monopolistic milling licenses; and controlling access to 
landholdings to ensure land rents and labour dues. These four landlord strategies created 
multiple and often contradictory incentives for serfs to engage in nonfarm occupations.  
 
10.2. Demesne Manufactories 
 
First, landlords directly intervened in the non-agricultural sector by establishing 
demesne manufactories.69 The making of iron and glass was particularly profitable, leading to 
a proliferation of ironworks and glassworks operated directly by the manorial 
administration.70 Commercial fish-farming was another widespread demesne enterprise, in 
which landlords mobilized their control over both land and labour to set up extensive non-
agricultural enterprises on their estates. Many Bohemian landlords also set up demesne 
                                                        
69 Janoušek (1967), 12; Svoboda (1969), 74; Kočí (1963), 336; Maur (1976), 49; Maur (1981), 207, 211; Maur 
(1990), 114, 120; Klíma (1955), 131, 154; Myška (1979), 55-8. 
70 A detailed discussion is in Myška (1979). Maur (1976) documents similar tendencies (45-7). 
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breweries and distilleries, using labour from serfs to transport grain to the plant and manorial 
powers to oblige serfs to purchase quotas of beer and spirits.71  
Bohemian landlords’ expansion of demesne enterprises does not directly explain the 
non-agricultural occupational structure in the Berní Rula, which solely reflects serfs’ own 
nonfarm activities. But demesne enterprises affected serf occupations indirectly via manorial 
labour demand. In attempting to increase the profitability of their estates by diversifying into 
non-agricultural activities, Bohemian landlords confronted the problem of obtaining 
industrial labour. After the Thirty Years War, market wages were high because labour was 
scarce, as a result both of wartime depopulation and of religious emigration after 1651. 
Landlords tried to reduce wage costs by replacing hired labour, for which they had to pay 
high market wages dictated by labour scarcity, with coerced labour, which they could use 
their institutional powers under the second serfdom to extort from serfs.72 Demesne 
ironworks, glassworks, breweries, distilleries, and commercial fish-farming operations often 
mobilized ‘Robot’, feudal labour services which serfs were obliged to deliver to the overlord 
under the manorial system. Even more often, landlords demanded so-called ‘forced wage-
labour’, whereby serf labourers, although paid to work in the lord’s demesne enterprises, 
were compulsorily obliged to accept such work in return for below-market wage rates. At the 
same time, however, landlords were aware of the low quality of coerced work, and therefore 
used it to replace hired workers only in the lowest-skilled, least quality-sensitive tasks, 
mainly manual labour.73 In the well-documented case of iron-making, for example, no serf 
labour was employed in the actual production and processing of iron, which required highly 
skilled and careful workers, but auxiliary operations such as transportation of raw materials 
were done mostly by serf labour.74  
The demand for labour in demesne enterprises created incentives for landlords to 
expand their activities into villages that already had labourers who were not fully employed 
in agriculture, in order to take advantage of local labour pools. External workers were far 
more expensive: they had to be compensated to migrate; they had to be attracted through the 
offer of market wages; and, since they were not serfs subject to the local landlord, they could 
not be coerced or controlled through his institutional powers under the second serfdom. Local 
                                                        
71 Cerman (1996); Ogilvie (2001); Ogilvie (2005d), 421-4. 
72 Kočí (1963), 336; Maur (1976), 119-20; Maur (1965), 288, 297; Svoboda (1969), 77.  
73 Petráň (1963), 165-6; Maur (1976), 93, 121; Maur (1981), 208. 
74 Maur (1976), 120-21; Myška (1979), 59-61. Similar situation was in other industries such as brewery and 
milling (Maur (1976), 121).  
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serf workers were easier and cheaper to obtain in villages where they were not fully involved 
in agriculture. This motivated landlords to establish a presence in villages where such 
activities were already highly developed, in order to monitor and mobilize local non-
agricultural labour pools.  
 
10.3. Rent Extraction from Serf Enterprises 
 
A second manorial intervention which interacted with serfs’ non-agricultural activity 
was the increasing practice of granting permits for serfs to engage in crafts and commerce in 
return for paying fees to the manor. Depopulation resulting from the Thirty Years War and 
post-war religious ejections shrank the pool of artisans and craftsmen in towns.75 Landlords 
profited by granting licenses to rural weavers and spinners in return for annual rents, loom 
fees, and spinning dues.76 Any serf or freeman who wanted to produce glass in rural Bohemia 
had to obtain the landlord’s permission to use the land for constructing the glassworks as well 
as to build new houses for the workers. Rural bakers, butchers, potters and other craftsmen 
were often obliged to pay license fees to the manor in return for permission to practise their 
crafts. Such industrial or commercial dues from serfs might proliferate in the presence of 
demesne manufactories, since ironworks and glassworks often led to building villages around 
the plant to house workers, enabling additional rents to be extracted from crafts and 
commercial operations servicing the manufactory and the surrounding industrial settlement.77  
The fact that Bohemian landlords could use their institutional powers to extract rents 
from their serfs’ non-agricultural activities reduced manorial incentives to forbid serf non-
agricultural activity although, as we have seen, urban guilds sometimes put pressure on 
landlords to restrict the expansion of rural industries. Indeed, landlords had a positive 
incentive to encourage any serf non-agricultural activity from which they could extort a share 
of the proceeds. The institutional characteristics of the Bohemian second serfdom were thus 
not inconsistent with a positive association between landlord presence and certain forms of 
                                                        
75 Klíma (1955); Klíma (1957). 
76 Klíma (1955), 444-5; Klíma (1957), 90-1. Similar explanation is provided by Petráň (1963), 277. 
77 Klíma (1955), 153-4. Glass-making is not the only non-agricultural activity which was subjected to rent-
extraction by  landlords. For example, Míka (1960), 142-3, documents cases for various tertiary-sector activities, 
while Maur (1990), 113, documents rent extraction in other non-agricultural activities.    
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rural nonfarm activity by serfs. This does not, however, establish whether any such 
association was causal or in which direction causation ran.  
On the one hand, landlords had incentives to encourage non-agricultural activities in 
villages because of the rents they could extract from those activities. Once they had 
encouraged such activities, they had an incentive to establish a presence on holdings in such 
villages in order to monitor payment of rents and fees. On the other hand, landlords had an 
incentive to occupy or use holdings in those villages which already had high level of non-
agricultural activities. Existing non-agricultural activities in a village might attract manorial 
attention and create incentives for a manorial presence in the village to ensure that any 
manorial dues payable by rural craftsmen were properly delivered and that activities that 
might threaten manorial interests were controlled. Such considerations make it likely that the 
positive association between at least a small degree of landlord presence and greater non-
agricultural activity in a village – the upward slope of the inverted-U curve – resulted more 
from landlords being attracted to industrial or commercial villages than from industry and 
commerce being attracted to villages where landlords were present. 
 
10.4. Milling Monopolies 
 
Bohemian landlords also sought to extract rents from the rural economy by limiting 
competition, with knock-on effects on non-agricultural activity.78 One major sector in which 
Bohemian landlords sought revenues by limiting competition was milling.79  Many Bohemian 
landlords assigned each of the villages on the estate to a mill owned by the landlord, obliged 
villagers to use only these mills, and forbade them to use mills belonging to peasants, towns, 
or other landlords. Another tactic was to grant a non-manorial mill a monopsony over 
particular groups of villagers and oblige the miller to pay a fee to the manor in return – i.e. to 
share some of his monopoly rents with the landlord.80 Landlord presence on holdings within a 
village could facilitate surveillance over local activities including violations of manorial 
milling prerogatives, whose frequency is attested by manorial court records.81 The presence 
of manorial personnel using holdings in a village made it possible for the manor to monitor 
                                                        
78 Examples of those practices are documented in Krofta (1949), 209-15, Klíma (1955), 78-80, Janoušek (1967), 
14-6; and Ogilvie (2001). 
79 Maur (1990), 109. 
80 Maur (1976), 44-5; Maur (1990), 109-12; Ogilvie (2001), 446.  
81 Ogilvie (2001), 446. 
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the activities of the miller and any spin-off activities, and to burden them with additional 
dues, increasing their costs and stifling the intensity of non-agricultural activity that the 
presence of a mill in the village would otherwise have encouraged.  
The nexus of incentives created by manorial milling prerogatives is consistent with 
the negative coefficient in Table 6 on the interaction term between mills and landlord 
presence. Independently, both mills and landlord presence were associated with higher non-
agricultural activity. But in villages where both coexisted, the landlord’s presence reversed 
the positive effect of mills. The two different institutional components of the second serfdom 
– the extraction of manorial rents from serfs’ non-agricultural occupations and the extraction 
of manorial rents from mills – exercised countervailing effects on the overall intensity of 
rural nonfarm activity. 
 
10.5. Regulation of Access to Landholdings 
 
Landlord powers under the second serfdom also pursued policies in completely 
different spheres, such as access to landlholdings, which then had unintended knock-on 
consequences for the non-agricultural sector. Manorial restrictions on access to landholdings 
affected widowed female farmers particularly strongly.82 As discussed above, female 
headship in the 1654 Berní Rula was  very low by western European standards. An 
econometric analyses of a sample of Bohemian villages found that between 1591 and 1722, 
the period generally regarded as seeing the greatest intensification of the Bohemian second 
serfdom, there was a significant decline both in the level of female headship and in the 
elasticity of female headship with respect to socioeconomic influences favouring female 
economic independence. Local sources reveal manorial administrators dissolving female-
headed households as poor fiscal risks and yielding to rent-seeking by village communities 
and other serfs who sought to take over women’s farms for their own ends.83 
As discussed in Section 9, female household headship by itself was positively 
associated with rural non-agricultural activities. But as Table 7 shows, in villages with 
landlord presence, this relationship not only ceased to be positive, but actually turned 
                                                        
82 For discussions of restrictions on women’s property rights in Bohemian law and on different Bohemian 
estates before and after serf emancipation, see Ogilvie and Edwards (2000); Velková (2010), 257-9; Velková 
(2012), 508. 
83 Ogilvie and Edwards (2000). 
 
 
53
negative. Independently, both female headship and landlord presence were associated with a 
higher intensity of non-agricultural activity. But in villages where both co-existed, the 
landlord’s presence reversed the positive relationship between female headship and non-
agricultural activities, thus stifling a major source of non-agricultural initiative emanating 
from the serfs themselves. Even where landlords were motivated to encourage non-
agricultural occupations in order to extract rents from them, manorial policies to restrict 
female headship exercised a countervailing negative impact on non-agricultural activity. 
These negative interaction effects between landlord presence and other factors – 
female headship, milling – which normally favoured rural nonfarm activity draw attention to 
a much broader consideration. The second serfdom was a multi-faceted institutional system 
which consisted of a multifarious and ever-proliferating conglomeration of policies and 
regulations by which landlords sought to extract rents from their serfs.84 Where landlords 
could see a way of extracting rents by permitting their serfs to engage in non-agricultural 
activities, they were understandably willing to do so. This incentive may have been especially 
strong in villages where the landlord was able to establish a foothold making it possible to 
monitor and profit from local non-agricultural activities. But landlords also engaged in other 
rent-seeking activities, such as creating milling monopolies and restricting female headship, 
which increased the costs and risks for serfs to engage in non-agricultural activities. It seems 
likely that this underlies the negative coefficients on the interaction terms between landlord 
presence and female headship or milling. This may also explain why the relationship between 
non-agricultural activity and landlord presence followed an inverted-U shape: after a certain 
point, heavy landlord presence in the village meant that manorial encouragement of specific 
non-agricultural activities was outweighed by the stifling effect of broader manorial rent-
extraction.  
The multiple effects of manorial rent extraction may also account for the low overall 
proporation of rural non-agricultural activity in Bohemia, which paralleled that in other 
European societies in which landlords enjoyed strong institutional powers. As Table 2 
showed, rural non-agricultural activity in early modern Bohemia, Poland and Finland was 
substantially lower than in western European economies. Many Bohemian villages in 1654 
had no serfs pursuing non-agricultural occupations, and the average proportion of rural non-
agricultural activity was quite low. In Bohemia, landlords permitted non-agricultural 
                                                        
84 Ogilvie (2013); Klein (2013); Dennison (2011, 2013); Briggs (2013). 
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activities under circumstances in which they were institutionally and logistically able to 
extract rents from them, including in villages where they had at least some local presence. 
But the wider panoply of manorial rent-extraction imposed heavy costs and risks on serf 
entrepreneurship, creating an institutional environment in which it was difficult for non-
agricultural activity to expand beyond a certain level. Thus although local manorial oversight 
might motivate landlords to permit some rural nonfarm enterprises, the general framework of 
the second serfdom exercised broader negative effects on rural non-agricultural activity.85 
 
11. Conclusion 
 
Changes in occupational structure, particularly the growth of rural non-agricultural 
activities, are widely viewed as key indicators and potential contributors to economic growth 
during the early modern ‘Little Divergence’. But we still know little about occupational 
structure in those many European economies that experienced the intensification of landlord 
powers under the early modern second serfdom. This paper sought to address this gap by 
presenting quantitative evidence on occupational structure in a richly documented eastern-
central European society under the second serfdom and analyzing its socioeconomic 
correlates. 
Our quantitative evidence for some seven thousand Bohemian villages in 1654 adds 
substance to the impression gained from less systematic sources for other societies, that 
eastern-central, nordic and southern Europe had a lower intensity of non-agricultural 
activities than the Netherlands or England during the ‘Little Divergence’. On the other hand, 
Bohemia was not purely agricultural under the second serfdom: its rural economy was 
characterized by a rich array of rural industrial and commercial activities and although many 
Bohemian villages were purely agricultural, there were also some where all households were 
involved in industry or commerce.  
Controlling for other village and estate characteristics, rural non-agricultural activity 
in early modern Bohemia was significantly and positively associated with village size, 
pastoral agriculture, sub-peasant social strata, Jews, freemen, female household heads, and 
mills. It was negatively related to arable agriculture and the presence of towns. These highly 
                                                        
85 For an analysis of how these constraints on growth were exercised, see Klein (2013). 
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significant statistical relationships refute traditional assumptions about Chayanovian peasant 
behaviour, suggesting instead that Bohemian serfs decided how to allocate time and other 
resources according to their relative productivities in alternative activities. The negative 
association between rural nonfarm activity and urban proximity casts intriguing doubt on the 
hypothesis, derived from western Europe, that urban centres uniformly benefited economic 
growth. At least in this eastern-central European economy, towns stifled rural crafts and 
commerce, possibly because of urban privileges giving town burghers and guilds institutional 
entitlements to hinder rural competitors. 
Our econometric analysis found a positive association between landlord presence in a 
village and rural nonfarm activities, but the relationship turned negative at higher levels and 
landlord presence reversed the otherwise positive non-agricultural effects of female headship 
and village mills. Our findings for early modern Bohemia do not, therefore, imply that the 
second serfdom encouraged rural dynamism. Rather, they illuminate the multiplicity and 
complexity of the links between landlords’ rent-extraction and serfs’ economic decisions. The 
non-agricultural activities observed in seventeenth-century Bohemia arose overwhelmingly 
from the initiative of serfs themselves. Landlords permitted those non-agricultural activities 
by serfs from which they could obtain rents for themselves, while stifling non-agricultural 
initiatives – such as those surrounding female household heads and village millers – that 
threatened manorial rent extraction. These wider unintended consequences of manorial 
constraints may help explain why Bohemia, like other societies in which landlords enjoyed 
strong institutional privileges, had lower levels of non-agricultural activity than western 
European societies during the early modern ‘Little Divergence’.  
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Appendix A: Robustness Checks  
 
As mentioned earlier, given the parametric nature of the Tobit estimator, we estimated 
regression equation (1) with less restrictive OLS and PPML estimators. OLS served as a first 
way of examining our data, but does not deal with problems of censoring. PPML allowed us 
to deal with the large number of observations with the value zero for our dependent variable 
and with the parametric assumptions of the Tobit estimator. In both cases, the results 
presented in Tables 5 and 6 were confirmed.86  
We also estimated alternative regression specifications. Specifically, we explored the 
arable sector in greater detail by using total land per holder instead of arable land per holder, 
accounting thus for fallow land. We also used the total land used for spring and winter crops 
separately: the results were similar to those reported in Tables 5 and 6.  
We also experimented with the ‘social strata’ categories and the number of holders 
with less than 15 strych of land by sequentially including each of them in the regression 
specifications. We did this in order to account for potential multicollinearity of those 
regressors. Reassuringly, the results were similar to those reported in Tables 5 and 6.  
Finally, we explored the information on breweries and ironworks provided in the 
Berní Rula, since these centralized manorial enterprises represented a different type of rural 
non-agricultural activity than the household-based serf enterprises recorded for ordinary 
taxpayers. Here we did not find any robust and statistically significant results, probably 
because of the small number of observations (there were only 12 villages with recorded 
breweries and only 6 with ironworks, in a data set of 7,257 villages).  
 
                                                        
86 The results are available from the authors upon request. 
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Appendix B: Estimation with More Radical Treatment of Outliers 
Table 5a: Regression Analysis of the Determinants of Non-Agricultural Occupations in Rural Bohemia in 1654 (Tobit Model) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Size of Village        
number of holdings 0.0042*** 0.0043*** 0.0043*** 0.0042*** 0.0042*** 0.0043*** 0.00429*** 
 [0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00002] 
percentage of empty holdings  -0.15*** -0.16*** -0.15*** -0.151*** -0.14*** -0.13*** 
  [0.0015] [0.0017] [0.0015] [0.0014] [0.0018] [0.0014] 
Arable Sector        
total arable land of occupied holdings per holder -0.00118*** -0.0012*** -0.0008*** -0.00119*** -0.0005*** -0.0005*** -0.0005*** 
 [0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00002] 
Pastoral Sector        
number of working animals per holder -0.009*** -0.012*** -0.01*** -0.0089*** -0.006*** -0.0056*** -0.007*** 
 [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0004] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] 
number of cattle per holder 0.0005*** 0.00089*** -0.00009 0.0005*** 0.0004** 0.0001*** -0.0003 
 [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0003] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] 
Social Strata        
percentage of 'cottagers' 0.14*** 0.14***  0.15*** 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 
 [0.0007] [0.0008]  [0.0008] [0.0001] [0.001] [0.0001] 
percentage of 'smallholders' 0.28*** 0.27***  0.28*** 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 
 [0.0009] [0.0009]  [0.0009] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
percentage of 'freemen'    0.13*** 0.09*** 0.1*** 0.1*** 
    [0.001] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009] 
percentage of Jews    2.59*** 2.50*** 2.49*** 2.49*** 
    [0.0016] [0.0019] [0.006] [0.0016] 
percentage of ‘peasants’   -0.22***     
   [0.001]     
Other Village Characteristics        
presence of mill 0.30*** 0.29*** 0.298*** 0.299*** 0.298*** 0.295*** 0.297*** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.00103] 
percentage of female household heads 0.047*** 0.029*** 0.024*** 0.021*** 0.018*** 0.020*** 0.015*** 
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 [0.002] [0.0025] [0.003] [0.002] [0.0025] [0.0027] [0.002] 
presence of a town on estate -1.773*** -1.77*** -1.76*** -1.79*** -1.78*** -1.77*** -1.79*** 
 [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0007] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005] 
percentage of holders with less than 15 str of arable 
land     0.108*** 0.11*** 0.106*** 
     [0.00112] [0.00113] [0.00113] 
Second-Serfdom Proxies         
presence of a holding held/used by landlord  0.066*** 0.085*** 0.087*** 0.086*** 0.087***   
 [0.0003] [0.00068] [0.00069] [0.00068] [0.00068]   
percentage of arable land held/used by landlord      0.23***  
      [0.003]  
number of holdings held/used by landlord       0.0095*** 
       [0.0002] 
        
Constant 0.41*** 0.41*** 0.408*** 0.28*** 0.21*** 0.19*** 0.21*** 
 [0.00057] [0.0006] [0.0007] [0.00059] [0.00058] [0.00058] [0.00058] 
        
Estate Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
        
N 5937 5937 5937 5937 5937 5907 5937 
        
Log-likelihood value -1125.2 -1112.0 -1110.7 -1095.7 -1090.1 -1072.5 -1099.2 
Sigma 0.23 0.23 0.228 0.228 0.227 0.225 0.2276 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.54 0.545 0.546 0.55 0.55 0.56 0.551 
Sources: see text        
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Appendix B: Estimation with More Radical Treatment of Outliers 
Table 6a: Regression Analysis with Second- Serfdom Non-Linear Terms (Tobit Model) 
  (1) (2) 
Size of Village   
number of holdings 0.00432*** 0.00431*** 
 [0.00002] [0.00002] 
percentage of empty holdings -0.146*** -0.144*** 
 [0.0023] [0.0013] 
Arable Sector   
total arable land of occupied holdings per holder -0.00053*** -0.00051*** 
 [0.00002] [0.00002] 
Pastoral Sector   
number of working animals per holder -0.0055*** -0.0059*** 
 [0.0003] [0.0003] 
number of cattle per holder 0.0009*** -0.0004** 
 [0.0002] [0.0002] 
Social Strata   
percentage of 'cottagers' 0.087*** 0.095*** 
 [0.001] [0.00098] 
sh percentage are of 'smallholders' 0.198*** 0.21*** 
 [0.0014] [0.0012] 
percentage of 'freemen' 0.11*** 0.099*** 
 [0.0009] [0.0009] 
sh percentage are of Jews 2.491*** 2.497*** 
 [0.007] [0.001] 
Other Village Characteristics   
presence of mill 0.295*** 0.297*** 
 [0.001] [0.001] 
percentage of female household heads 0.012*** 0.011*** 
 [0.0029] [0.0025] 
presence of a town on estate -1.77*** -1.79*** 
 [0.0005] [0.0005] 
percentage of holders with less than 15 str of arable land 0.11*** 0.106*** 
 [0.00114] [0.00113] 
Second-Serfdom Proxies   
percentage of arable land held/used by landlord 0.27***  
 [0.023]  
(percentage of arable land held/used by landlord)
2
 -0.06**  
 [0.03]  
number of holdings held/used by landlord  0.044*** 
  [0.001] 
(number of holdings held/used by landlord)
2
  -0.0049*** 
  [0.0001] 
   
Constant 0.19*** 0.21*** 
 [0.0006] [0.0006] 
Estate Dummies YES YES 
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N 5907 5937 
Log-likelihood value -1072.5 -1092.9 
Sigma 0.225 0.227 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.556 0.553 
Sources: see text   
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Appendix B: Estimation with More Radical Treatment of Outliers 
Table 7a: Regression Analysis with Second-Serfdom Interactions (Tobit Model) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Size of Village    
number of holdings 0.0042*** 0.0044*** 0.0043*** 
 [0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00002] 
percentage of empty holdings -0.15*** -0.142*** -0.143*** 
 [0.00143] [0.0012] [0.00141] 
Arable Sector    
total arable land of occupied holdings per 
holder 
-0.00050*** -0.00051*** -0.00053*** 
[0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00002] 
    
Pastoral Sector    
number of working animals per holder -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.005*** 
 [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] 
number of cattle per holder 0.0004** -0.0001 -0.0009*** 
 [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] 
Social Strata    
percentage of 'cottagers' 0.093*** 0.088*** 0.094*** 
 [0.001] [0.00101] [0.001] 
percentage of 'smallholders' 0.207*** 0.19*** 0.208*** 
 [0.0012] [0.0013] [0.0012] 
percentage of 'freemen' 0.08*** 0.1*** 0.09*** 
 [0.00092] [0.00092] [0.00093] 
percentage of Jews 2.49*** 2.48*** 2.488*** 
 [0.02] [0.006] [0.002] 
Other Village Characteristics    
presence of mill 0.3*** 0.29*** 0.3*** 
 [0.00114] [0.00113] [0.0011] 
percentage of female household heads 0.05*** 0.037*** 0.039*** 
 [0.00396] [0.00385] [0.0036] 
presence of a town on estate -1.78*** -1.77*** -1.79*** 
 [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005] 
percentage of holders with less than 15 strych 
of arable land 
0.109*** 0.11*** 0.106*** 
[0.00112] [0.00114] [0.00113] 
    
Second-Serfdom Proxies with Interactions    
presence of mill x presence of a holding 
held/used by landlord 
-0.099***   
[0.005] 
  
percentage of female household heads x  
presence of a holding held/used by landlord 
-0.49***   
[0.03] 
  
presence of a holding held/used by landlord  
0.11***   
[0.002]   
    
    
presence of mill x percentage of arable land  -0.12***  
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held/used by landlord  [0.02]  
percentage of female household heads x 
percentage of arable land held/used by 
landlord 
 -1.57***  
 [0.14] 
 
percentage of arable land held/used by 
landlord  
 0.3***  
 [0.005]  
    
    
presence of mill x number of holdings 
held/used by landlord 
  -0.023*** 
  [0.002] 
percentage of female household heads x 
number of holdings held/used by landlord 
  -0.28*** 
  [0.016] 
number of holdings held/used by landlord    0.046*** 
   [0.001] 
    
Constant 0.22*** 0.2*** 0.22*** 
 [0.0006] [0.0006] [0.0006] 
    
Estate Dummies YES YES YES 
    
N 5937 5874 5904 
    
Log-likelihood value -1087.2 -1069.5 -1092.5 
Sigma 0.227 0.225 0.228 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.5554 0.555 0.551 
Sources: see text    
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